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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE PARTIES: ANALYSIS
OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TREBLE DAMAGE SUIT
RECENT years mark a startling animation of antitrust enforcement by private
parties.' The private antitrust suit, despite its tender of trebled damages,
was dormant for years.2 As of 1940, a half century of private action had pro-
duced a mere 175 reported cases with judgment for plaintiff in only 13.3 But
after World War II, the private antitrust claimant suddenly emerged from
over fifty years of obscurity. Reported victories between 1945 and 1951 leaped
to one and one half times the number compiled during the entire previous
history of private antitrust litigation.4 Today, private actions are rapidly
1. Private suits are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act which reads: "[A~ny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1946), superseding similar provisions in the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 210 (1890) and
28 STAT. 570 (1894). Private suits for injunction are authorized by § 16 of Clayton.
Injuries arising from violations of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, §2 (1946), the Clayton Act, 38 STAr. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12-§ 14 (1946) and
both the civil and criminal provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946) fall within Clayton's provisions for private suitors. However, be-
cause the FTC Act does not specifically authorize private suits, courts have dismissed
private claimants under § 5 of the Act for want of jurisdiction. Samson Crane Co. v.
United National Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd inere., 180 F.2d 896
(1st Cir. 1950). Cf. Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D. N.Y. 1923) (deny-
ing admission of an FTC order under § 5 of Clayton, since the order does not issue
"under the antitrust laws"). A broad interpretation of §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act
which specifically authorize private redress for violations of the "antitrust laws" could
include private suits under FTC § 5 as an antitrust law. Other statutes that do not specifi-
cally authorize private relief have been judicially interpreted as granting private causes
of action. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (lead-
ing case upholding private cause of action for violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act), discussed in Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1133-5 (1950).
Incorporated cities, Chattanooga Foundry Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906),
and states, State of Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), but not the United States,
United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1940), are "persons" within the meaning of
Clayton Act § 4 and can sue for treble damages. Proposed amendments allow the United
States to recover treble damages, H.R. 109, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), or only actual
damages, H.R. 3406, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
2. For colorful description of the failure of private antitrust enforcement from its
inception until 1940, see HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcrboN (TNEC Monograph
16, 1940) passim.
3. Comment, 18 U. OF Cxi. L. REv. 130, 138 (1950). The total amount of damages
awarded from 1890 to 1940, $1,270,000, ibid., is more than quadrupled by reported awards
in the last six years. See notes 225, 321-3 in!ra.
4. See Appendix II, 1064 infra.
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multiplying: from 118 suits pending in United States District Courts in
June 1947, the total as of last June had mounted to 367.u
The private antitrust suit is a curious combination of public regulatory
and private compensatory law. While parties sue to enforce federal antitrust
policy, recovery hinges upon a showing that violations cause injury to plain-
tiffs. Even where a valid cause of action exists, defenses common to civil
litigation may bar suit: and special economic defenses are available for actions
based on Robinson-Patman violations.
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION
The Violation
Recent expansion of the substantive law of antitrust violations has broadened
the range of activities subject to private attack. While price-fixing or pegging
agreements have long been illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act,0
concerted refusals to deal are now equally unlawful. 7 And Sherman Act "con-
spiracies" encompass a growing catalogue of business behavior, such as "con-
sciously parallel" action of two or more defendants," or agreements between
parent corporations and their subsidiaries.9 Since Sherman Act § 2 "mo-
nopoly" proscriptions are now largely tested in terms of market control,1
a recent vastly narrowed concept of the relevant "market" may popularize
5. Cases newly commenced each year have climbed similarly. See Appendix I, p.103
infra. Actually, the number of suits is even greater since figures do not include patent,
copyright, trademark cases and counterclaims of any type. Ibid.
6. E.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
7. E.g., Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945). See Comments: 53 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949)
passim; 61 YA.L L. J. 381, 398-403 (1952).
8.. E.g., American Tobacco Company v. United States, 323 U.S. 781 (1946); Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203 (1939). See generally, Rostow, The
New Shernura Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF CM. L Rm,. 567, 580-
86 (1947) ; Comment, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or Fancy?, 3 Sr.::. L RE%, 679 (1951).
The doctrine has been stretched to its farthest point in a recent private suit, Milgram v.
Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. ,Vsai 3273 (U.S., April
22, 1952). For other movie cases interpretating the "conscious parallelism" doctrine see
note 222 infra.
9. E.g., Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1943) ; United
States v% General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). Agreements between affili-
ated corporations may also be "conspiracies." Kiefer-Stevrart Co. v. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
10. E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 323 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 143 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See Rostow, Monopoly
under the Shermnan Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745, 761 et scq. (1949) ;
Comment, 60 YALE L. J. 294 (1951). But cf. Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopo-
lization-A Reply to Prof. Rostow, 44 ILL- L. REV. 269 (1949).
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§ 2 for treble damage suits. Not only giants such as Alcoa or enterprises as
vast and complex as the movie industry may now encounter § 2 challenge;
the recent Supreme Court Larain Journal decision " and the striking Gailco
holding of the First Circuit 12 bring § 2 into focus on every enterprise meet-
ing newly expanded interstate commerce tests.13
Corresponding expansion has developed the Clayton Act. Under recent § 3
Supreme Court interpretations, exclusive dealing arrangements and tying
sales seem unlawful whenever a substantial share of commerce in the relevant
market is involved. 14 Recently-amended § 7 endangers mergers that may
result in lessened competition.'6 And passage of the Robinson-Patman amend-
ment in 1938 revived the dormant price discrimination provisions of § 2 of
the Act.16 In addition, the Robinson-Patman amendment outlaws a series
of specific activities, such as "brokerage" concessions to direct buyers, and
sellers' "proportionately unequal" advertising allowances or services to cus-
tomers,17 and makes buyers as well as sellers subject to prosecution and
private suit.' Section 3 of Robinson-Patman, a criminal provision, outlaws
some forms of price cutting and largely reiterates the price discrimination
strictures of § 2.19 Judicial interpretation of Robinson-Patman reveals the
amendment as a catchall, with litigation turning up violations in all business
contexts.20  Moreover, as construed by the Supreme Court's Morton Salt
decision, the price discrimination provisions come into play if the challenged
11. The Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal by sole
newspaper in community to accept advertising from local radio station advertisers held
an attempt to monopolize in violation of § 2). See Comment, 61 YAL L.J. 948 (1952).
Cf. United States v. Klearflex Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
12. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.
1952) (refusal to renew dealer's lease on space in building which is center of local produce
trade held an attempt to monopolize under § 2).
13. For expanded interstate commerce tests see pp. 1013-6 infra.
14. See, e.g., Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (ex-
clusive dealing arrangement) ; United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F.Supp. 280 (S.D.
Cal. 1951), aff'd per curian., 343 U.S. 922 (1952) (same). The per curian, decision
raises doubt as to Standard Oil's vitality. The four dissenters in Standard Oil adhered
to their previous views but affirmed to avoid overruling Standard Oil in the absence
of a full court. Ibid. See also 20 U.S.L. WEmx 1161 (U.S. April 22, 1952). See
also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying sales). For recent
complete discussion see Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevancc of Economic Factors in Deter-
mining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HAIv.
L. REv. 913 (1952).
15. See Note, 64 H.Av. I. REv. 1212 (1951).
16. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion, 60 YAixa L. J. 929,
940 et seq. (1951) (hereinafter cited as Rowe).
17. See note 23 infra.
18. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 194 F2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952).
19. Rowe at 940 n.65.
20. Id. passim.
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pricing creates merely "a reasonable possibility" of injury to competition,2 '
with injury to "competition" apparently construed as injury to individual
competitors.2 2 And practices under other parts of the act are illegal per se,
demanding no demonstration of competitive injury at all.2
Interstate Commerce
Though Sherman Act boundaries extend to the full limits of Congressional
power over interstate commerce,24 courts have been slow to read "commerce"
requirements broadly for private plaintiffs.2  Interstate transactions 20 or
activities involving traditional channels of interstate commerce - were long
within the reach of private enforcement. And private parties could attack
local activities found part of an interstate violatory scheme.3 But otherwise,
21. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 334 U.S. 37 (194S). See also American Can Co.
v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 33, 54 (Sth Cir. 1951) (freight equalization which
"conceivably might substantially lessen competition" held illegal price discrimination).
22. 334 U.S. at 50; Standard Oil of Indiana v. FTC, 173 F2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949),
rcv'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), criticized in Adelman, Integralion awd Anti-
trust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv. 27, 60-64 (1949) ; Note, 59 YALE L J. 153 (1949).
23. E.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945) (brokerage);
Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806
(1947) ("proportionately equal" services). Cf. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass
Co. 150 F2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied. 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (same).
24. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 293 (1945). Cf. Apex
Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
25. See Comment, 44 II.I. L. Rv. 493 (1949). For the development of expanding
"commerce" interpretations, see Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 229-235 (1948). A summary of current doctrine is found in Note, IS U. o
Crr. L. REv. 171 (1951).
26. See Note, 35 COL L. REv. 1072 (1935).
27. Where restraints were concerned with instrumentalities of commerce, the Sherman
Act was held applicable, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (com-
bination of shipowners fixing employees' wages and allocating work); even though the
restraint aimed solely at local facilities used by interstate carriers, e.g., Bailey v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 4 F.Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1932) (local warehousing terminal) ; or at local
transportation from one interstate carrier to another, e.g., Eastman v. Yellow Cab Co.,
173 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1949) (conspiracy to limit cab licenses; cabs carry interstate pas-
sengers from one railroad station to another).
28. E.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (interstate conspiracy
effectuated through local agents' refusal to sell film to plaintiff movie e.' hibitor) ; Ramsey
v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 260 U.S. 501 (1923) (national combination of bill posters fixing
prices and refusing to post for unlicensed plaintiff solicitor). The doctrine has widespread
application in current cases, e.g., William Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F2d
738 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948) (illegal monopoly effectuated through
film distributors' dealings with local plaintiff movie exhibitor) ; Ring v. Spina, 143 F2d
647 (2d Cir. 1945) (individual intrastate contracts effectuate illegal national copyright
monopoly); Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (conspiracy to monopolize billiard industry effectuated through refusal to invite
plaintiff billiard player to tournament).
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private attack against local activities, both at the beginning and end of inter-
state distribution processes, was circumscribed by courts' insistence that action-
able restraints "directly affect" interstate commerce.29
In Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,30 however,
the Supreme Court invoked the full extent of federal commerce power to aid
Sherman Act plaintiffs injured in dealings prior to interstate distributions.
The Act was held applicable to California refiners' price rigging in intra-
state purchases from local California beet growers. Scuttling the "direct
effect" test, the Court found that the refiners' illegal activities, despite their
occurrence intrastate, "substantially affected" interstate commerce through
the ultimate movement of sugar in interstate markets. a But while the impact
of the broader "substantial effects" test is already being felt,8 2 Sherman Act
plaintiffs may still encounter difficulty where they are victims of illegal
restraints at the end of interstate movement.3 3 For exaunple, judicial conflict
29. Restraints striking manufacturing before interstate movement of goods affected
commerce only "indirectly," e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) ;
Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co., 127 Fed. 804 (4th Cir. 1904). And restraints directed
at products in the state of destination after interstate movement were outside interstate
commerce since products "came to rest" at the end of their journey. See Note, 35 CoL.
L. REv. 1072, 1086 nn.70-71 (1935). For a modern commentator's adherence to "direct
effect" criteria, see Reich, The Entertainment Industry and the Federal Antitrust Laws,
20 So. C.LiF. L. Ray. 1 (1946).
30. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
31. Id. at 229, 234-5.
32. E.g., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), Comment, Effect of Gar-
della on the Treble Damage Suit, 44 ILL. L. REv. 493 (1949) (restraints in baseball In-
dustry "affect" interstate commerce because of industry association with radio, television,
and transportation of paraphernalia). Contra: Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101
F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ; cf. Martin v. Chandler, 174 F2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949). And
see Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sales Co., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1 62,716 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950) (conspiracy of wool manufacturer and others to fix selling price of
wool-using garment manufacturer's products in same state affects interstate commerce).
For the implications of the "substantial effect" test in resale price maintenance cases,
see Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381, 396-8 (1952).
33. Courts demonstrate reluctance to grant relief:
(1) by finding that the activity restrained is not "trade or commerce," e.g., Federal
Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (baseball) ; Hart v. B. F. Keith
Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 703 (1926)
(vaudeville). But ef. H. B. Marienelli v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed,
165 (S.D. N.Y. 1914) (vaudeville).
(2) by finding "no public injury" because restraints arise in isolated transactions, e.g.,
Silverman v. Seifred, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1 62,874 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (interstate dealer
deprived of supplier's contract in local transaction thus forcing purchase of goods
elsewhere at higher prices); Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British Foreign & Marile
Insurance Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. CuNr 1 67,244 (7th Cir. 1952) (insurance com-
panies' concerted action in cancelling plaintiff manufacturer's insurance contracts pur-
suant to underwriter's report).
(3) by finding "no public injury" because restraints against plaintiff have no inter-
state market effects where manufacturers selling interstate terminate local dealers' agency
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may arise over Sherman Act applicability to sales by interstate defendants
from local warehouses to plaintiffs in the same state.34 Well-established "flow
of commerce" doctrines may be used, however, to extend the meaning of
"interstate transactions" to encompass some activities at the end of interstate
distribution.35
Litigation under Clayton and Robinson-Patman provisions is subject to
more stringent "commerce" requirements than Sherman Act suits.20 By the
terms of the former acts, it is not sufficient that violations "affect" interstate
commerce, they must involve transactions in interstate commerce. 37 Thus,
for example, an interstate supplier cannot be sued for sales that discriminate
contracts, e.g., Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 130 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Riedley
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 82 F.Supp. 8 (W.D. Ky. 1949) ; Neumann v. Bastian-Blessing
Co., 70 F.Supp. 447 (N.D. I1. 1947), and where interstate suppliers refuse to sell to local
dealers, e.g., Shotldn v. General Electric Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 194S) ; Mejunhen
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 33 F.Supp. 466 (N.D. Cal. 1940) ; Abouaf v. Spreckels Co., 26 F.
Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939), and where an interstate distributor combines with a local
dealer to force local plaintiff dealer out of business, e.g., Arthur v. Kraft-Pheni:- Cheese
Corp., 26 F.Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938).
However, association of the restrainted activity with radio, television, or transpor-
tation may bring restraints within the antitrust laws, Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1949), note 32 supra; as may plaintiff's sales to interstate travelers, e.g., Munson
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 91 F.Supp. 171 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Contra: Dunkel Oil Corp. v.
Anich, 1944-45 TRADE CAsEs 'i 57,306 (E.D. Ill. 1944).
34. E.g., Compare Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946) (complaint
dismissed), with Alabama Independent Service Station Association, Inc. v. Shell Petrol-
eum Corp., 28 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939) (complaint upheld).
35. E.g., Alabama Independent Service Station Association, Inc. v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., supra note 34. And see cases cited note 40 infra.
36. Whereas Sherman Act prohibitions are phrased: "Every contract ... in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States.. . .", and any monopoly of "trade or com-
merce among the several States," 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946) ; Clayton
and Robinson-Patman provisions read: "....unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce.. . .", 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 el scq.
(1946); as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 49 ST.xT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13
et seq. (1946). Sherman represents full exercise of Congressional power over interstate
commerce, see note 24 sup-a; but Clayton and Robinson-Patman do not, see e.g., Myers
v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F.Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
37. While the plaintiff does not have to be engaged in interstate commerce, see e.g.,
Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (plain-
tiff local retailer alleges that defendant discriminates in favor of competing retailer in
another state), the defendant must not only be engaged in, but must practice his restraints
in interstate commerce, see e.g., Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F.Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951)
(complaint dismissed where sales are from interstate defendant's refinery located in plain-
tiff's state): Nachman v. Shell Oil Co., 1944-45 TRAPS CAsEs 57,361 (D. Md.
1945) (jury charge: if goods shipped to plaintiff from warehouse in same state, plaintiff
can recover only if his order to interstate supplier were by phone to office in another
state). Even if plaintiff sells in another state, his action against a local competitor will
be dismissed where plaintiff's interstate sales are small (1%). Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice
& Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1949).
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in favor of purchasers competing with plaintiff, where the point from which
the supplier sells is in the same state as the buyers.38 And relief is similarly
denied even though one of the purchasers may subsequently sell to interstate
travelers.39 But some court holdings expand the meaning of "transactions
in" interstate commerce to reach diametrically opposite results. These courts,
finding local warehouses a "temporary halting place" for goods, urge that
intrastate sales from warehouses to plaintiffs are part of the "flow" of inter-
state transactions.40 Anomalously, supposedly more stringent Clayton and
Robinson-Patman provisions thus allow suits in situations where adherence
to some narrow Sherman interpretations excludes them.41
Cause
A private plaintiff must show that the defendants' violations caused his
injury.42 "Legal cause" for the private suitor is, as in tort law, a catchall
concept subsuming several issues.43 Of course, plaintiff must show some physi-
cal causation between violation and injury.44 But assuming the presence of
38. E.g., Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1937) (relief denied
except where tank cars bringing oil into state deliver to plaintiffs directly) ; Myers v.
Shell Oil Co., supra note 37; Nachman v. Shell Oil Co., ibid.; Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 81 F.Supp. 547 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), rezvd on other grounds,
178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
39. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F.Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950).
40. Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., 1950-51 TRADE CASES If62,859 (N.D. Ill. 1951)
(intrastate sales from defendant storehouse to plaintiff and others in area are part
of "stream" of commerce from defendant dairy plant in another state) ; Spencer v. Sun
Oil Co., 94 F.Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950) (interstate commerce involved by wholesale sale
of gas to party in same state from tanks filled from out of state sources on basis of cal-
culated estimate of needs); Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F.Supp. 436
(N.D. Ill. 1941) (same). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 237-8 (1951).
41. Compare cases cited note 40 supra, with Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d
99 (3d Cir. 1946).
42. See statutes cited note 1 supra.
43. See e.g., James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L J. 761 (1951) passimn; PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 311-75 (1941).
44. E.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951) (no
physical cause where injury arose from producer's alleged refusal to license first run pic-
tures, but plaintiff unable to show he requested first run films); Momand v. Universal
Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948) (where previous litigation adjudicated
that only two counts of violation were valid, plaintiff's evidence shows no damages specifi-
cally caused by these counts) ; Sager Glove Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 149 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1945) (references to government suit against defendants concerning patented
items irrelevant in complaint alleging violations in respect to unpatented items) ; Vance
v. United States, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1162,761 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) (complaint with
allegations that injury results from illegal combination's piracy of songs dismissed; piracy
is not an antitrust violation, and piracy, not the violation, allegedly caused injury) ; Mc-
Whirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 76 F.Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (plaintiff,
alleging illegal discounts given by defendant, unable to show that purchasers bought from
defendant because of the discount) ; Hoffman v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc.,
1016 [Vol. 61 : 1010
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some physical causation, different types of fact contexts elicit varied court
responses under labels of "cause" or "direct injury." Two distinct problems
arise where antitrust plaintiffs have transacted business with violators of the
antitrust laws: (1) injuries may result from causes other than the violation;
and (2) the same activities that produce illegal restraints in one area of the
economy may cause private injuries in another area. In addition, courts face
the problem (3) of plaintiffs who do not deal with violators, but suffer losses
stemming from the injuries of parties who do.
Where there is more than one cause of injury, the issue for trial is whether
the comparative significance of the violation's causal role warrants attributing
plaintiff's injury to it.45 Previously, courts frequently made this determination
as a matter of law and stated conclusions of causal sufficiency in "direct-
indirect" terminology.46 But now, where any reasonable inference of causal
relation is possible, courts generally permit plaintiffs to reach juries.4 7 Bigelow
v. RKO 48 definitively established the guiding principle. The Supreme Court
ruled that plaintiff movie exhibitor was entitled to access to a jury on his
showing of some causal relation between his losses and defendant distributors'
illegal system of film release. In addition, the Court imposed on defendants
the affirmative burden of proving the portion of loss not caused by violations.42
55 F.Supp. 13 (S.D. N.Y. 1944) (defendant shows that reason for alleged illegal refusal
to sell was the "unsatisfactory" account of plaintiff).
45. Even though plaintiffs show some causal relation between violation and injury,
other factors may concurrently cause injury as well, e.g.. Fifth & Walnut v. Lew's, Inc.,
176 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1949) (theatre troubles due more to location and type of patronage
than to defendant's film distribution practices) ; Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949), 63 HAm'. L. REv. 907 (1949) (business losses probably
due to depression) ; McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 76 F.Supp. 456 (AV.
D. Mo. 1948) (var and shortages rather than defendant's practices probably account for
decline in sales). For difficulties in proof created by manifold causation of injury, see
HAm.LTON & TiL, A=TRUST IN Acrim 84 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940); Ncte, (4
H'Av. L. REv. 317 (1950) (discussed from viewpoint of damages). Consequently, the prob-
lem of "cause" may become one of evaluating the significance of the violation's influence
on losses.
46. See cases cited in Comments: 44 ILL L. REv. 493, 497-8 nn20, 23 (1949); 49
YALE L.J. 284, 297 n.83 (1939).
47. E.g., Bordonaro Brothers Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1949) (failure of one defendant's actions to coincide with those of other de-
fendants does not show absence of cause where reasonable inference possible for jury);
Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948) (refusal to dis-
miss complaint where plaintiff can conceivably show causal relation); Louisiana Pro-
tective Ass'n v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419 (Sth Cir. 1942) (same;
"no matter how improbable" that plaintiff can show cause he is entitled to go to the jury) ;
Camrel Co. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 1944-45 TR-im CAsss ff 57,233 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944) (same).
48. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).,
49. "[T]he jury could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the
proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' business, and
from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits, and values, not shoun to be attribug-
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However, despite the Bigelow rule, multiple causation may still produce
judges' determination of "indirectness of cause," even though reasonable
causal inferences seem present. 0
Courts also deal with multiple causation problems in the guise of deter-
mining whether plaintiffs have suffered a "legal injury."' 1  For example,
when plaintiffs allege that antitrust violations have defeated expected gains
from projected contracts, courts may refuse to recognize the loss of anticipated
profits as an "injury. '5 2 They similarly find no "legal injury" when alleged
violations thwart profit expectations from a business expansion which plaintiff
is unequipped to effectuate. 53 In fact, however, the "injury" in these situations
is identical with the "injury" from lost profits on contracts already consum-
mated, or lost profits of an equipped concern; i.e., the defeated expectations
of gain. The difference lies in the relative significance of the violation's causal
role in defeating profit expectations: loss of profits from contracts still in a
negotiation stage, for example, may stem from influences, other than the
violation, that might have prevented consummation in the first place.54 The
able to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the plailtiffs."
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
While the original justification for inferential proof was the unavailability of evidence
because of the "wrongdoer's misconduct," see id. at 265, the reasonable inference jury
rule has become a general rule of pleading and appellate practice, see cases cited note 47
supra.
The effect of Bigelow is treated in McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, [1950]
U. OF ILL LAw FORUm 659, 665-8; Notes: 61 HARv. L, REv. 187 (1947) ; 41 ILL. L. Rrv.
464 (1946). And see William Goldman Theatres, Inc., v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d
Cir. 1945), 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
50. E.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), note
44 suqpra; A. J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Co., 81 F.Supp.
890 (D. Mass. 1949), notes 52, 54 infra.
51. See e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (court
deals with multiple causation as ability to show "fact of damage"); Bausch Machine
Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 2117 (2d Cir. 1935) (same). See [1950]
U. OF ILL. LAW FoRum 659, 666: "this so-called 'fact of damage' is nothing more than a
showing that the wrong complained of has caused injury or . . . that it constitutes the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." And see cases cited notes 52, 53 inlra.
52. E.g., Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASES ff 62,911 (W.
D. Ark. 1951) (action dismissed where prospective purchaser of theatre alleges that de-
fendant induced co-defendant to sell to him by promising not to compete) ; A. J. Goodman
& Sons, Inc. v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 F.Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949)
(action dismissed where defendant contracted to supply plaintiff for his public bid, If
accepted, and also submitted public bid at a lower price). Cf. Corey v. Boston Ice Co,,
207 Fed. 465 (D. Mass. 1913) (action for damages from loss of corporation officership
where plaintiff not ensured of re-election.
53. E.g., Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Electric Products Corp., 152 F.2d
398 (3d Cir. 1945) (complaint of exclusion from potential market dismissed where plain-
tiff's plant barely produces enough for his own needs).
54. In the Goodman case, supra note 52, the court, while speaking in terms of "in-
jury" asserted the uncertainty of contract consummation as a ground for dismissal. Cf.
Corey v. Boston Ice Co., supra note 52.
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choice of treating the problem as one of "multiple cause," on the one hand,
or "legal injury," on the other, may initially seem semantic. But the difference
is significant. Since "legal injury" criteria are court-applied, they provide
convenient means to circumvent the Bigelow rule requiring submission of
causal issues to the jury whenever there is a reasonable inference that the
violation caused injury. 5
Illegal activities directed at one area of the economy may equally injure
plaintiffs in other areas who transact business wvith the antitrust violators.
Previously, sparse holdings indicated that private suits might be available to
these plaintiffs.56 But the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Confcrence of
Studio Unions v. Loew's, I11c. 7 holds the contrary. In the Conference case,
plaintiff labor union alleged that defendants, major studios and another union,
had conspired to drive independent movie studios out of business. The alleged
conspiracy took the form of contracts between the defendants whereby major
studios agreed to deal with defendant union exclusively. In exchange, defend-
ant union agreed to accept lower wages in work performed for the major
studios, and to perform all of major studios' work before doing any for the
independent studios. As a result of the conspiracy, plaintiff union claimed
that it lost employment at the major studios. 5 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of the complaint. It found that since plaintiff union's loss of employ-
ment did not result from the object of the conspiracy, impairment of com-
petition among movie studios, the cause of the injury was "indirect."0 9 Since
parties are frequently injured by violations directed elsewhere, the implications
of the Ninth Circuit's rationale are far-reaching.00 However, lack of precedent
55. The use of court-applied "legal injury" criteria is similar to the use of the doc-
trine that damages are "speculative" to take cases away from the jury. See, e.g., First
National Pictures v. Robison, 72 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1934) (inferences of damages "specu-
lative" where exclusion from controlled market bars showing what business could make
in free market); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 310 (3d Cir. 1921)
(same). And see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). For
the use of "legal injury" criteria for the same purpose in respect to another proximate
cause issue, see notes 63-6 infra.
56. E.g., Roseland v. Phister Manufacturing Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942) (sales
agent may recover from his employer for loss of employment resulting from employer's
vertical integration); Klein v. Sales Builders, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CAsEs IT 62,6C0
(N.D. IlL 1950) (commission saleman's loss of income recoverable when caused by em-
ployer's giving illegal lower rates to chain stores), suit subsequently dismissed for failurc
to prove injury, 1950-51 TADE CASES 162,950 (N.D. 11. 1951).
57. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951).
53. The facts of the case are set out id. at 52-3.
59. Id. at 54-5.
60. E.g., the application of the Conference rule would have precluded recovery in cases
cited note 56 supra; and the rule is used to bar suit where plaintiffs do not deal with vio-
lators, but suffer injury through dealings with parties injured in transactions with vio-
lators. See p. 1021 infra.
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for the holding and presence of contrary doctrine may mitigate the impact
of the Conference of Studio Unions ruling. 61
Plaintiffs who do not deal with the violators may suffer losses in business
transactions with the violations' immediate victims. In Seaboard Terminal
Corporation v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 2 for example, plaintiff company,
transacting business with a dealer victimized by a Sherman Act violation, sued
the violators for profits lost from vanished transactions with the dealer. The
court denied relief on grounds of "indirect cause," applying the same criteria
later used in the dissimilar Conference of Studio Unions case: plaintiff's
injury was not "designed as part of the conspiracy, but was merely a result
of it." Other courts, in terms of "direct injury," deal with the same causal
problem. The requisite "directness of injury" was held lacking, for example,
in a number of suits by shareholders,0 3 officers,0 4 creditors,00 landlords, 6 or
attorneys 67 of victimized businesses. Despite these barriers to plaintiffs who
sustained losses through the antitrust injuries of intermediate parties, some
recent decisions portend a contrary result. Recent successful actions by em-
ployees 08 and a lessor 09 of antitrust victims indicate hitherto unavailable
actions for plaintiffs more remote on the causal chain.70 Since the physical
causation between antitrust violations and injury may extend indefinitely,
61. For contrary holdings, see note 56 supra. While the 9th Circuit found support in
language of earlier decisions, every case cited as authority by the court was irrelevant to
the holding, for each concerned plaintiffs who did not themselves deal with violators. See
cases cited notes 63-6 inf ra.
62. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 1640.237 (D. N.Y. 1936).
63. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574 (2d Cir.
1916) ; Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) ; Gerli v. Silk Ass'n, 36
F.2d 959 (S.D. N.Y. 1929) ; Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 207 Fed. 459 (D. Mass. 1913).
64. E.g., Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 Fed. 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
65. Cf., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
66. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F.Supp. 389 (S.D. N.Y.
1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) ; United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916).
67. Cf. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574, 577
(2d Cir. 1916).
68. McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 76 F.Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948)
(complaint upheld; judgment for defendant on merits). And cf. cases cited note 56 supra.
69. Camrel Co. v. Paramount Film Distributors Corp., 1944-45 TRADE CASES 57,233
(S.D. N.Y. 1944).
70. Since the actions by stockholders, creditors, and officers of a corporation all in-
volved the possibility of a multiplicity of recoveries for the same injury, see, eg., Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910), they are distinguishable from
other possible actions by parties more removed along a single causal chain. Aside from
suits where multiplicity arises, actual holdings seem evenly divided for suits by remote
plaintiffs.
See Comment, 44 ILL. L. REv. 493, 501-5 (1949) where, although the commentator
confuses the problem of causation with "commerce" requirements for private suits, he in-
dicates possibilities for extension of recoveries along a single chain of causation.
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the problem is simply the desirability of cutting off recovery at some point
along the causal chain.71 But courts, at least overtly, have not so handled the
issue, and have determined recovery by resort to purely verbal criteria.
Relief
Inunctimis. Courts, to halt actual or potential injuries caused by antitrust
violations, may grant injunctive relief to private plaintiffs.72 Since the in-
junction aims to prevent future injuries, it may issue even though plaintiffs
show only threatened rather than existing damage1 3 Preliminary injunctions
are available to maintain the status quo pending litigation. 4 But preliminary
relief will not be granted where it might alter the status quo or where material
issues are in dispute.1 5 On the other hand, once litigation is concluded, courts
may permanently enjoin defendants from engaging in violations. In the exer-
cise of a broad equitable discretion, courts are free to tailor permanent in-
junctions to the needs of individual plaintiffs.71 However, the scope of the
71. See James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L. J. 761, 783 ct scq. (1951). See also
sources cited, id. at 784 n.86. And see Comment, 44 ILL. L. Rnv. 493, 501-5 (1949).
72. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1946). Where injunction and damage claims
are joined, plaintiff is still entitled to a jury if the claim is "basically" for damages, see,
e.g., Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 313 (1943), and
cases cited 166 F.2d at 550, and an award of injunction alone does not entitle plaintiff to
attorney fees, see, e.g., Milgrarn v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Decorative
Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1928) ; Alden-Rochelle, Inc.
v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), but it does entitle him to costs, see e.g.,
Ring v. Spina, 84 F.Supp. 403 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); Midwest Theatres Co. v. Cooperative
Theatres of Michigan, 43 F.Supp. 216, 225 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
73. While earlier, courts spoke in terms of a "dangerous probability" of harm to justi-
fy injunctions, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S.
37 (1927), injunctions are now granted if Tiarm is simply threatened, e.g., Alden Rochelle
v. ASCAP, 88 F.Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (power to raise prices illegally and exclude
competitor).
74. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1946). And see Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1945).
75. E.g., Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949);
Anderson-Friberg, Inc. v. Justin Clary & Son, Inc., 98 F.Supp. 75 (S.D. N.Y. 1951);
Volk v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE C. ss V 62,784 (D. Minn. 1950) ; Tann v. Standard
Oil Co., 1950-51 TRADE CAsES 1 62,723 (N.D. Ill. 1950). Nor will a preliminary injunc-
tion issue if no irreparable injury will otherwise result, e.g., Reynolds International Pen
Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., 63 F.Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1945). But even where irreparable in-
jury is shown, the injunction must not disturb the status quo, see e.g., Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1940). Appeal from a denial of preliminary
injunction will be considered only in case of an abuse of discretion. Meiselman Theatres
v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 180 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1950) (denial affirmed).
76. Courts apply usual equitable principles to private antitrust injunctions. See statute
cited note 72 supra. And see Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
While discretion is broad, courts will not issue an injunction to compel a defendant
patentee to grant a license, Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 83 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.
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injunction is scrupulously confined solely to the parties and issues before
the court.77
Damages. Once plaintiffs establish violations causing injury, they must
demonstrate the amount of loss suffered.7s As damage yardsticks, they may
select: (1) loss of profits; 79 (2) increased costs;80 or (3) depreciation in
value of business or property.8 ' When decline in value of business or property
is not taken into account by either of the first two standards, it may be used
concurrently with each.8 2 However, under any accepted standard, plaintiffs
may not recover for damages that could have been avoided with due diligence. 83
1937) ; nor to restrain enforcement of illegal contract clauses which defendant has aban-
doned, General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 18 F.
Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937) ; nor where plaintiff is in pari delicto or has unclean hands, see
notes 119, 120 infra.
77. See, e.g., Allen Bradley v. Local #3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (injunction modified);
Milwaukee Towne Corp: v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951) (same) ; Ring, v.
Authors' League of America, 186 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 935
(1951) (same). And see Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F.Supp. 325 (N.
D. Ill. 1948).
78. For general discussion of damages see Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages under
the Antitrust Law, 88 U. or PA. L. REv. 511 (1940); McConnell, The Treble Damage
Action, [1950] U. OF ILL. LAW FoRUm 659 (1950); Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under
the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L. J. 117 (1940) ; Comment, 18 U. OF
Cmr. L. REv. 130 (1950) ; Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1950).
79. See note 97 infra. For cases prior to 1940 see Donovan & Irvine, mpra note 78,
at 517 n.30. While traditional lost profits recoveries are measured by anticipated earn-
ings lost by the victim of a violation, one commentator interprets recent cases to indicate
a possible additional measure based on the benefit the wrongdoer receives from his mis-
conduct. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 668. Subsequent decisions lend additional sup-
port to this view. See Twentieth-Century Fox v. Brookside Theatre Corp., CCII TRADE
RE. REP. CURRENT 67,218 (8th Cir. 1952) (where plaintiff is forced by violation to sur-
render leasehold, evidence of profits of plaintiff's successor, one of the defendants, may
go to jury) ; Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 1950-51 TRADE CAsEs
1f 62,945 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (loss of profits measured by net profits of defendant in territory
illegally usurped).
80. See notes 87, 98 infra; Donovan & Irvine, supra note 78, at 517 n.28.
81. See notes 82, 91 infra; Donovan & Irvine, supra note 78, at 516 n.25.
82. See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555
(1931) (lost profits plus depreciation). And see note 91 infra. But plaintiff may not recover
for lost profits plus maintenance expenses. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.,
150 F2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945), 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
811 (1948).
83. E.g., American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951)
(plaintiff could have prevented losses due to delays in delivery) ; Sun Cosmetic Shoppe
v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) (if business losses ex-
ceed the amount of discrimination stemming from defendant's supplying a "demonstrator"
to plaintiff's competitor, plaintiff cannot recover the excess, since his own hiring of a
demonstrator could have prevented the additional loss). But cf. Dean Milk v. American
Processing & Sales Co., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1f 62,777 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (plaintiff, suing
for competitor's discrimination that draws off plaintiff's customers, does not have to meet
discriminatory price).
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While use of all other damage measuring rods is generally approved,
lower court decisions in the early 40's leave the status of "increased cost"
measurement open to question. Following the government proceeding in
United States v. Socony Vacuum 8- for violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
gas jobbers sued Socony for increased costs of gas caused by Socony's un-
lawful stabilization of prices. When jobbers could not demonstrate that in-
creased costs had not been passed on to their customers, courts denied
relief.15 Since the requirement of showing that increased costs have not been
passed on is equivalent to insistence on "lost profit" standard, these decisions
in effect repudiate the "increased cost" yardstick.80 However, later holdings
applying "increased cost" measure of damages indicate that the Socony rul-
ings may have little remaining force.
8 7
Robinson-Patman plaintiffs may generally select damage measurements
geared to specific violations. Where buyers sue on grounds of discriminatory
price treatment or withholding of "proportionately equal" allowances or ser-
vices, "general" damages may be measured by the precise amount of the dis-
crimination or inequality.88 Generally, courts reason that the favoring of one
84. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
85. E.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F2d 967 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944) ; Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 56 F.
Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944), aff'd. 148 F.2d 580 (Sth Cir. 1945), cert. dmnied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945) and cases cited therein; Leonard v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F.Supp. 369
(D. Wis. 1942), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942). The holdings are criticized
in Comment, 18 U. OF CHrL I_ REv. 130, 136-7 (1950).
86. The decisions leave open the question of whether the plaintiff, if he shows sanme
injury, may then apply the "increased cost" yardstick, or whether the plaintiff can only
recover for "'lost profits." A similar problem arises with Robinson-Patman "general"
damages. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1949), would permit recovery only for the lost profits. For argument that "increased
costs" measures should apply, see Comment, 18 U. OF CHI. L Rnv. 130, 137-S (1950).
87. E.g., Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) (purchaser re-
covers difference between monopoly contract price and reasonable price); ef. Alden-
Rochelle v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888, 897 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (excessive royalties, if shown,
can be recovered). And see Robinson-Patman "general" damage cases using "increased
cost" rationale, note 88 infra. Earlier decisions uniformly permitted "increased cost" re-
covery. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 234 U.S. 66 (1917) (shippers paying unreasonable
freight rates because of combination of ocean carriers recover difference between monopoly
rates and reasonable rates); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938) (purchaser
recovers, from defendant who illegally comers grain market, difference between price paid
and reasonable price).
88 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (damages equal the difference between defendant's salary
payment for "demonstrator" of plaintiff's competitor and for "demonstrator" of plaintiff) ;
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 187 F2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), rehearing denied,
190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951) (price discrimination), following dicta in Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947) (denial of defense of antitrust violation in
action on a note). But where "general" damages are granted they may be limited to the
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buyer over another is akin to an "increased cost of business." Consequently,
they hold that a showing of discrimination or inequality itself demonstrates
injury and that the "general" measures apply.89 Other courts, however, may
defeat application of "general" damage yardsticks by requiring plaintiff to
demonstrate an injury caused by the discrimination or inequality. 0 In any
event, Robinson-Patman plaintiffs may not only recover "general" damages,
but may also sue concurrently under usual damage measures if the additional
damages will not duplicate "general" damage recovery.91
Plaintiff's choice of alternative damage measures may allow private re-
coveries in the absence of injury. For example, "increased costs" measure-
ment of damages may be applied even when plaintiffs have avoided loss by
passing on costs to their customers.02 And in suits for unlawful refusals to
sell, courts may permit recovery for lost profits on unobtainable items al-
though losses may have been offset by gains from sales of obtainable sub-
stitutes.93  In addition, permissible Robinson-Patman "general damage"
standards may bear no relation to actual loss: a discriminatory price or
"proportionately unequal" allowance or service may enhance the favored
recipient's business position; disfavored buyers, however, suffer loss only
to the extent that the enhanced position impinges on their business, and often
amount of the discrimination in excess of cost savings to the defendant from the dis-
crimination. American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir.
1951). Robinson-Patman plaintiffs may also recover for "lost profits" instead of "general
damages." See American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907
(7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
89. E.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) ; Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can. Co., 87
F.Supp. 985, 990 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) (lower court
cites to "increased cost" cases as authority for "general" damages).
90. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949). Cf. American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
While Russeilville has been considered inconsistent with cases allowing "general" damages,
see Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 304 (1952), this reading seems erroneous. As recognized by the
court itself in Russellville, supra, at 55, the rule of "general" damages still applies in usual
situations. But since the plaintiff in Russellville actually benefited from the change in
pricing point which gave rise to the charge of discrimination, Russellville falls within the
exception to the "general" damage rule for "extraordinary" situations. See Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947). Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, on the other
hand, is an explicit repudiation of the "general" damage rule, and furthermore, may only
permit recovery of usual damages (if injury is shown) up to the amount of discrimination,
Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., supra, at 153.
91. E.g., American Can Co. v.. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951)
("general" damages plus loss of good will). Cf. Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., 1950-51
TPADE CASES 1162,859 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (upholding complaint with prayer for damages
equaling amount of illegal rebates plus value of lost patronage).
92. See sources cited note 87 supra.
93. E.g., Frey & Son v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 240 Fed. 114 (4th Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 251 U.S. 551 (1919).
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it may not.94 In some extreme cases courts have revolted against injury-less
recoveries that stem from fictional yardsticks and dismiss actions with judicial
findings of "no injury." But generally, fictional measuring rods are accepted.
Courts recognize that while fictional yardsticks may not gauge the extent of
injury in many situations, strict adherence to required showings of the
amount of injury sustained would preclude actions for a host of violations.03
Under all damage standards, lack of precise proof of damage amounts
no longer blocks private recoveries. Previously, under the guise of preventing
damages that were "speculative," courts, by barring inferential proof of losses,
created difficult evidentiary barriers for private suitors."6 But generally today,
once plaintiff demonstrates some injury, juries may infer lost profits from
past earning records of plaintiff's business or from current earning records
of similar enterprises. 7 And monopoly increases in costs to plaintiffs are
94. E.g., compare American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F2d 38 (8th
Cir. 1951) (no actual loss), with Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp.
985 (S.D. Fla. 1949) (actual loss).
95. See discussion and cases cited in McConnell, supra note 78, passin.
96. See, e.g., Bausch Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F2d 217
(2d Cir. 1935) (inability of new business to show profits prior to defendant's illegal acts
makes damages "speculative") ; First National Pictures v. Robison, 72 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 609 (1934) (exclusion from controlled market gives no basis
for calculating damages) ; Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (3d Cir.
1921) (same). But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359, 579 (1927). The doctrine continued to apply in circuit and lower courts until fairly
recently, see, e.g., Finley v. Music Corp. of America, 66 F.Supp. 569 (S.D. Cal. 1946)
(evidence of profits based on predecessor's operations before conspiracy is "speculative") ;
Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictures, 150 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 251 (1946)
(evidence of operation prior to conspiracy plus competitors' profits during conspiracy).
97. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) ; Milwaukee
Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 969
(1952) ; Bordonaro v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949) ; William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1945) (remanding), 69 F.
Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811
(1948); Theatre Investment Corp. v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 72 F.Supp. 650 (W.D.
%Wash. 1947) (permitting, but disapproving comparison measure). And see recent cases
cited note 79 supra. While the use of inferential proof was justified on the theory of not
permitting the wrongdoer to benefit from the lack of certainty created because of his own
deeds, see, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., supra, at 265, at least one court
permitted it independently of the "wrongdoer" rule, on the basis of the standardized oper-
ating costs and clear features of comparison in the movie industry. See William Goldman
Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F.Supp. 103, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Bigelow not only establishes acceptability of inferential proof, but also shifts the bur-
den of proof: once plaintiff shows some injury, defendant must show what part of the in-
jury is not due to the violation. See p. 1017 supra. And see, e.g., Bordonaro v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949); American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v.
Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
The leading Bigelow case evoked a storm of comment heralding the new rules for
inferential proof, see sources cited note 49 supra, with one commentator regarding
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demonstrable with inferential estimates of what market price would have
been under competitive conditions. Despite these new rules, courts retain
ample tools for dismissing plaintiffs whose proof is, in their opinion, un-
acceptable: "purely speculative" damages 09 and failure to produce the best
evidence available 100 can result in dismissal; and courts may always resort
to findings of "no injury" or "indirect cause." 101
Tax considerations may govern a treble damage plaintiff's selection of
damage measures. Recoveries are taxed in terms of the injury for which
they compensate.'0 2 Thus, for example, damages (or settlements) for lost
profits are taxed as profits, i.e., at income tax rates.103 On the other hand,
recoveries that simply replace a loss of permanent investment are not taxable
at all. 04 Should they exceed the loss, they are regarded as returns on capital
and consequently are subject to capital gains tax rates.10 In addition,
recoveries for loss of "good will" may also be accorded return of investment
or capital gains treatment. 106 Since different theories of recovery may pro-
duce different tax consequences, clever complaint drafting or cooperation
Bigelow as the primary reason for the recent rise in private antitrust suits. See MeCon-
nell, supra note 78, at 664.
98. See, e.g., Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947). Similarly,
a seller who receives less for his product because of buyer's monopoly may use inferential
proof to show price he would have received in absence of a violation. Mandeville Island
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. CURRENT 67,246 (9th Cir.
1952); La Chapelle v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 90 F.Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1950).
99. E.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 83-4 (7th Cir.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951) (damages based on accountant's own
idea of reasonable returns with no basis in the particular business are "speculative"). And
see cases cited note 96 supra.
100. E.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 99 (no business
books presented in evidence); Alden-Rochelle v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y.
1948) (inter alia, lack of expert testimony). And see sources cited Donovan & Irvine,
supra note 78, at 516 n.27.
101. See pp. 1016-21 supra.
102. See, e.g., Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). For general discussion of antitrust tax
problems, see Magill, The Income Tax Aspects of Antitrust Litigation, 30 TAxEs 210
(1952).
103. See, e.g., Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 102; Swas-
tika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1941). And see Buck Glass
Co. v. Hofferbert, 176 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1949) (refund of illegal royalty charges).
104. Cf. Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 102, at 113. And
see cases cited note 106 infra.
105. See discussion of Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947), in
Magill, supra note 103, at 212.
106. Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932). For criticism of the "good will" cri-
terion, see Magill, supra note 102, at 211-13.
1026 [Vol. 61 - 1010
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
in settlements may permit plaintiffs to retain recoveries undiminished, or
subject to more lenient capital gains tax rates. 07
Attorney Fees. Plaintiffs who win damage suits receive attorneys' fees as
well as damage awards.10s The amount of attorney fee award to victorious
damage plaintiffs rests in the discretion of the trial judge;109 and where
plaintiffs are successful on appeal, the appellate court may award additional
amounts."10 Among the factors considered by courts in awarding fees are:
attorneys' time, responsibility and effort; the complexity of issues; prevailing
rates for legal services in the local area; and the results of trial."' All agree-
ments between client and attorney outside of court are disregarded in the
court's fee computation." 2
While fee awards theoretically rest in trial court discretion, recent hold-
ings set ceilings on permissible amounts. In a recent unprecedented move,
the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loe-z,'s, Inc., 1 3 feeling that
past fee awards had been lavish,"x4 established a blanket rule to govern lower
courts' fee computations. Beginning with the premise that the amount of
damage awards was to bear no relation to fee computation,"" the court
equivocally concluded that all fees in excess of 50 per cent of single damage
recovery would be automatically considered an "abuse of lower court discre-
tion."" 6 Apparently, fee awards are now suspect. The Milwaukee Towne case
107. But the taxpayer must show how recovery is allocated, e.g., Raytheon Production
Corp. v. Commissioner, note 102 supra (in the absence of evidence of business' tax basis
and amount of good will, recovery treated as income), for the determination by the
Commissioner is presumed correct. See, e.g., Armstrong Knitting Mills v. Commissioner,
19 B.T.A. 318 (1930) (unfair trade practices settlement).
108. See statute cited note 1 supra. An award of injunction alone, even where origin-
ally joined with damage claim, does not entitle plaintiff to attorney fees. See note 72
supra.
109. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 946
(8th Cir. 1952) ; Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 101 F2d 79, 81 (2d
Cir. 1939); Applebaum v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1950-51 TRAE CAsEs 02,944 (S.D.
Miss. 1951).
110. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., CCH TrDz
RE. REP. CURRENT 67,246 (9th Cir. 1952) ; American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co.,
44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. S99 (1930).
111. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F2d 846
(8th Cir. 1952) (with special emphasis on prevailing rates in the area); MAilwaukee
Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951) (same); Applebaum v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 1950-51 TADE C.sEs ff 62,944 (S.D. Miss. 1951).
112. See cases cited note 111 supra.
113. 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), ccrt. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
114. The court commented on the "delicate and embarrassing matter," noting that
the "fabulous amount allowed" would "equal the total annual salary received by all mem-
bers of the Supreme Court." Id. at 569-70.
115. Id. at 571.
116. Ibid. Fees in the case were reduced from $M25,000 to ,z5,000.
1952] 1027
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
has already been followed by the Eighth Circuit," 7 as well as by some district
courts." 8
DEFENSES
"Pari Delicto" and "Unclean Hands"
"Pari delicto" and "unclean hands" defenses may preclude damages and
injunctions in private antitrust suits. The defense that plaintiff is "in pari
delicto" (at equal fault) may bar legal redress for all parties whose injuries
stem from an illegal undertaking." 9 The "unclean hands" defense rests on
broader grounds. Relief may be denied to plaintiffs whose own illegal activi-
ties have some significant relation to the subject matter of suit,120 including,
of course, the situation where plaintiff and defendant are engaged in the
same illegal transaction.
Recent decisions, however, practically banish these defenses from anti-
trust litigation. In a recent treble damage suit, Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram
& Sons,'21 defendant liquor sellers conspired to fix maximum resale prices
in sales to plaintiff wholesalers. Defendants urged that the maximum price
fixing attempt, held a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, was directed
at reducing resale liquor prices to break through rates set by a minimum-
price fixing conspiracy among plaintiff and other Indiana wholesalers.1 '2
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's jury charge that plaintiff's con-
spiracy with other wholesalers was no defense to the treble damage suit. -2
117. Twentieth Century-Fox v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.
1952). The court, in reducing a $150,000 award to $100,000, considered 40% of
single recovery excessive. A factor apparently strongly influencing the 8th Circuit
was the "shocking" nature of the award if it were to be paid out of plaintiff's damages
instead of by the defendant. The Milwaukee Towne case was cited with approval.
118. Sager Glove Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1162,956
(N.D. Ill. 1951) (court, desirous of granting larger award, feels constrained by Mihwvau.
kee-Towie holding); Applebaum v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASas
162,944 (S.D. Miss. 1951).
119. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694 (2d Cir. 1921) ; Blue-
fields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1 (3d Cir. 1917) ; cf. Tilden v. Quaker Oats
Co., 1 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1924). Par dclicto defenses have been applied in private antitrust
suits only where the parties were engaged, through conspiracy or contractual relationship,
in the same illegal transactions. See cases cited in Comment, 46 ILL. L. Ray. 654, 657 n.17
(1951). For the history and development of the defense that plaintiff violates the antitrust
laws, see Lockhart, Violation of the Antitrust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31
MIN. L. REv. 507 (1947).
120. E.g., Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1943) (plaintiff cannot recover for injury
to an illegal business) ; cf. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F.Supp. 408, 412 (D. Conn. 1950)
(relief by injunction against price cutters will not be granted to members of a retailers'
association who are involved in an illegal agreement to fix prices).
121. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
122. Id. at 212.
123. Id. at 214. The Court's holding was augured by the prior opinion in Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (purpose of combatting acknowledged
tort of "style piracy" does not justify combination to boycott tortfeasor copyists).
1028 (Vol. 61 : 1010
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Shortly thereafter, on the authority of the Kicfer-Stewart holding, the Tenth
Circuit reheard Moore v. Mead Service Co., ' 4 a treble damage suit under
the Robinson-Patman Act, and reversed its prior decision which had upheld
the interposition of a "pari delicto" defense.'2 5 In the Moore case, the court
had originally barred suit when it found that defendant, an out-of-town baker,
had drastically reduced his local prices to break the plaintiff town baker's and
retailers' conspiracy to exclude him from the local market.'2O
These decisions, barring the "pari delicto" defense even where plaintiff's
illegal activities actually provoke the defendant's violation, leave little room
for future application of the defenses in private suits.12 When plaintiffs
and defendants participate in the same violation, however, the defenses may
possibly still be invoked. Under Robinson-Patman, for example, both parties
to a discriminatory transaction equally violate the Act.12 But here as well,
application of the defenses is doubtful. Lower courts, even prior to Kiefer-
Stewart, developed rationales to bar the defenses when plaintiffs were ignor-
ant of defendants' violation ' 29 or proved "economic duress" that led to their
124. 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951).
125. Id. at 541. The earlier opinion of the court is found at 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir.
1950), remanded, 340 U.S. 944 (1951).
126. Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F.2d 338, 339 (10th Cir. 1950). Actually, the
holding of the Moore case goes further in restricting defenses than does Kiefer-S-wart.
In Moore, the retaliatory nature of the defendant's action w.as clearly found by the court,
ibid., while the causal connection betveen plaintiff's alleged violation and Kiefer-Stewart's
was not proved, see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 182 F.2d 2283, 233
(7th Cir. 1950). Moreover, the Kiefer-Stewart violation was /',r soe illegal, thus barring
inquiry into any reasonable justification for it. 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951). For conflicting
appraisal of the Moore and Kiefer-Sc-art cases compare Note, 51 CoL L Rm. 523
(1951) (favorable; criticizing Moore before rehearing and reversal), ,ith Comment, 46
IL- L. Rav. 654 (1951) (opposed).
127. Following the Supreme Court rationale in Kiefer-Strxart, 340 U.S. 211, 214
(1951), the available recourse open to the defendant would seem to be a counterclaim.
However, a separate suit can also be maintained. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid Continent Invest-
ment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). But while such recourse is feasible in the Moore situation
where defendant suffered discernible damages, see Petition for Certiorari for Plaintiff, pp.
3, 7, Moore v. Mlead Service Co., 340 U.S. 944 (1951), it will not be practicable where
defendant suffers little or no damage prior to his retaliation. And should defendant's proof
burdens or damages be slighter than plaintiff's, the initial violator may still gain.
128. Since Robinson-Patman outlaws payment as well as receipt of "brokerage," 49
STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1946), both parties were technically violators in
Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F.Supp. 93 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (plaintiff buyer pays
"under the table" to seller to avoid OPA price regulation), and Interborough News Cu.
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 10 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (counterclaim seller grants
rebates to insistent buyer). For parties engaged in the same illegal transaction in Sherman
Act cases, see note 119 supra.
129. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 47 F.Supp. 711 (W.D.
Pa. 1942) ; see National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F.Supp. 4, 7 (V.D. Pa. 1944). Refusal
to accept defenses also resulted where the plaintiff's cause of action arose after his par-
ticipation in the illegal scheme ceased. Connecticut Impurting Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries,
101 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1939).
19521 1029
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
participation. 30 Only where grant of an injunction might enhance a violat-
ing plaintiff's illegal position may defendants now be able to plead "pari
delicto" or "unclean hands" successfully.' 8 '
Statute of Limitations
Statute of limitations defenses. play a significant role in barring private
suits. Because there is no federal statute of limitations, private suits are
governed by state statutes 132 varying from one to ten years in length.03U
Thus success of plaintiff's suit may rest on the fortuity of location and local
interpretations of statutes never meant to govern federal antitrust litigation.Y"4
130. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (plain-
tiff's compliance with defendant's illegal activities in order to obtain goods required for
business) ; Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (plaintiff coerced into illegal agree-
ment to protect a $50,000 investment already made) ; and see Robinson-Patman cases cited
note 128 supra. The "economic coercion" argument is usually made in conjunction with
expression of desire to uphold enforcement of the antitrust statute, see ibid., or the ten-
dency "to hold those not actively engaged in promoting monopoly to be victims, rather
than participants in antitrust violations," see Ring v. Spina, supra at 652, and cases cited
therein.
131. See, e.g., Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F.Supp. 408, 412 (D. Conn. 1950), note
120 supra. And conceivably the holding of Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir. 1943), note
120 supra, still retains vitality.
132. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906)
(Sherman Act); Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 37 F.
Supp. 728 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (Robinson-Patman Act); Williamson v. Columbia Gas &
Electric Corp., 27 F.Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1939) (Clayton Act).
133. For applicable statutes with varying time periods in different states see Note,
60 YALE L.J. 553, 554 n.3 (1951). And see Hearings before Subcommilnee of House Judi.
ciary Comnittee on H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1951). For proposed amendments
to antitrust laws to provide a uniform statute of limitations and for discussion of the
proposals see id. passim. And see Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ; Hearings before Subeommiltee of
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; Note, 60 YALs
L. J. 553, 556 et seq. (1951).
134. Since no state has a statute applicable to treble damage suits, Hearings before
the Subcomnittee of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
57 (1950), federal courts must select the state statute most compatible with the "nature"
of the action. Confusion results, as even in the same state courts have applied different
limitations to private suits. Compare Northern Kentucky Tel. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 1 F.Supp. 576 (E.D. Ky. 1932), aff'd, 73 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1934) (Sherman
Act-i year limitation), with Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v, Nashville Coal
Co., 37 F.Supp. 728 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (Robinson-Patman Act-5 year limitation). For
additional confusion created by the limitation problem, see sources cited note 133 supra.
Recently, in Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer Coal Co., 191 F.2d 912 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 947 (1952), and in Schiffman Bros., Inc. v. Texas Co.,
20 U.S.L. WEEK 2526 (7th Cir. May 13, 1952), the court selected the Illinois two-year
limitation for "statutory penalties" rather than the five-year limitation governing "all
civil actions not otherwise provided for" to govern a treble damage suit. But the decision
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The harshness of short state limitation periods is somewhat mitigated by
liberal antitrust venue provisions that may permit plaintiffs to shop for more
favorable forums. 35 But choice is restricted by many state statutes that pre-
clude actions in a state's courts if suit is barred in the forum where the cause
of action arose.1 36 "While short limitation periods in some states thus preclude
private action, federal statutes lengthen periods of defendants' liability.
The wartime statute,137 suspending the running of limitations from 1942
to 1946, has uniformly been applied to private antitrust suits.133 And
government suits, during the pendency of the action, toll limitations on pri-
vate suits against defendants for the same violation.1 0 Consequently, lia-
bility of some defendants under longer state limitation periods may reach
back for almost two decades.
Cost Savings and "Good Faith Meeting of Competition"
Robinson-Patman defendants may utilize two statutory avenues for justi-
fication of discriminatory treatment. A proviso of § 2(a) legalizes price dif-
ferentials "which make only due allowances in the cost of manufacture, sale
or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities" in which
rested on the court's acceptance of Illinois courts' classification of similar Illinois actions
as "penal," whereas the characterization of the private antitrust suit is actually a federal
question. See Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, S90 (4th Cir. 1934).
For conflicting federal decisions as to the "civil or penal nature" of the private antitrust
suit see Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory?,
28 Ky. L. J. 117, 147-8, 152 (1940), where the commentator concludes that the weight of
authority considers the action "civil." Recent decisions support this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 100 F.Supp. 15 (S.D. N.Y.
1951); Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F.Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950).
135. See 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946) quoted in note I supra. And see
38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1946) quoted in note 186 in fra.
Plaintiffs may also attempt to mitigate harsh time limitations by seekcing application of
the federal equitable doctrine relating to "fraudulent concealment," i.e., that in cases fall-
ing within "fraudulent concealment," limitations do not run until fraud is discovered. See
Winider-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 10D F.Supp. 15 (S.D. N.Y.
1951). Contra: Burnham Chemical Co. v. Boranx Consol. Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol.
Ltd., 81 F.Supp. 301 (N.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 943 (1951). And see Note, 60 Yta L. J. 553, 557-s n.16.
136. See Developments in the Lau-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAlv. L. REv. 1177,
1262-4 (1950).
137. 56 STAT. 781 (1942), 59 STAT. 306 (1945) ; 15 U.S.C. § 16 n. (1946).
138. E.g., VFinlder-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 100 F.Supp.
15 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Tiffin Building Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 87 F.Supp. 121
(N.D. Ill. 1949) ; United West Coast Theatres Corp. v. South Side Theatres, Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 109 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
139. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1946). But even thjugh limitations dv n.,t
run during the pending government action, a plaintiff may still bring suit at the same time
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goods are "sold and delivered."'140 The burden of proving the seller's cost
saving rests on defendant, whether charged with granting 141 or receiving 142
discriminatory treatment. The requirements of the defense, however, have
never been clearly articulated.143 And although the FTC recently approved
in part a respondent's cost defense, "made in good faith and in accordance
with sound accounting principles,"'144 treble damage defendants have yet to
use the defense successfully.' 45 The future offers little hope for change.
Courts, possibly going beyond FTC requirements,140 may demand the unfea-
sible task of accounting proof which justifies price concessions to each in-
dividual buyer.147 While the cost defense is thus available in theory to treble
damage defendants, it may well prove illusory in fact. 1
48
140. For discussion, see Rowe at 961-5 and sources there cited. More detailed reitera-
tion appears in Note, 65 HARV. L. Rv. 1011 (1952). Since no similar proviso qualifies
Robinson-Patman § 3, the cost defense may be unavailable to a § 3 treble damage defen-
dant. See Rowe at 940 n.65. For a possible indication contra, see Bruce's Juices v. Ameri-
can Can. Co., 330 U.S. 743, 745-6 (1947). Brokerage clause and "proportionally equal"
clauses defendants cannot assert a cost defense. E.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC,
150 F.2d 607 (4th. Cir. 1945) (brokerage clause). Compare Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC,
156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947) ("proportionally equal"
services).
141. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44 (1948).
142. Automatic Canteen Co. .of America v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952).
143. See case discussion, Rowe at 962-4. Compare note 148 infra.
144. aMinneapolis-HQneywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 394 (1948), rcv'd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952).
145. See Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951); Russellville Canning
Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.
1951).
146. FTC counsel, however, have adopted the "individual buyer cost study" theory of
the Bruce's Juices case, note 147 infra. See Briefs of Counsel Supporting the Complaints,
pp. 38-9, Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. No. 3977 (pending) ; pp. 20-21, Electric
Auto-Lite Co., FTC Dkt. No. 5624 (pending).
147. Compare Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 985, 988-9 (S.D. Fla.
1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951), will
American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 59 (8th Cir. 1951).
148. Compare "Nevertheless, the utterances of the Commission over fifteen years and
the development in cost analysis during that time indicate that for many producers and
distributors a successful cost defense is now practicable," Note, 65 Hav. L. REV. 1011
(1952), with Edwards, Comments and Discussion, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr Sym-
Posiu 57, 60 (1947) ("the allocation of joint cost ... is a matter of business policy, not
a matter of fact ... we are in danger of erecting the FTC into a sort of an orthodox cost
accounting faculty"). Dr. Edwards is Director of the Bureau of Industrial Economics of
the FTC. See also statements of FTC Commissioner Mason, Progress of the Federal
Trade Connission, CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMPosIuM 50, 54 (1951). For the accuracy
of one of Dr. Edwards' earlier predictions, compare Edwards, The Struggle for Control
of Distribution, 1 J. MARKETING 212, 216 (1937) ("The pursuit of discrimination into the
labyrinths of cost accounting will produce a clash of accounting orthodoxies reminiscent
of the theological disputes of the early churchmen"), ath the battle of the accounting
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"Good faith meeting of competition" also excuses a seller's price discrimi-
nation.149 Only last year the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil df Indiana
case overruled FTC contentions and held "meeting competition" a full defense
to a price discrimination charge."," The ambiguity of the decision, however,
leaves defendants with little guide to the essentials of a successful defense.1'5 1
While undercutting a competitor's price apparently is never defensible, 15 2
the opinion gives no indication of how differences in trade acceptability of
competing products will affect decision on "meeting" a price.' 53 And while
the Supreme Court implied that a defendant can meet only "lawful" prices 1c4
and must meet them in "good faith," it supplied no criteria for testing "good
faith."155 Subsequent litigation has not defined the utility of the meeting
competition defense to the treble damage defendant.'"
PpIcricAI AmS TO PLAINTIFFS
The Federal Rules
Pleading and Discovery. Liberalized pleading under the Federal Rules
facilitates plaintiffs' litigation tactics. Impressed by the severity of triple
damages, courts formerly held plaintiffs to pleading requirements whose
experts, quoted in American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F2d 38, 51-2 (8th
Cir. 1951) (to one C.P.A., defendant's accounting system was "a well conceived, carefully
operated and very well organized system." Another C.P.A. had seen "none as crazy as
this.").
149. For discussion, see Rowe at 965-72 and sources there cited. As in the case of the
cost defense, note 140 supra, "meeting competition" may be unvailable to a § 3 defendant.
"Proportionally equal" clauses defendants, however, can probably utilize the defense. See
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 241 (1951) ; Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156
F2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
150. 340 U.S. 231 (1951). For full discussion, see Rowe at 965-72. More recent dicta,
however, may require defendants to prove absence of "injury to competition," although
the Supreme Court deemed this irrelevant once the requirements of "meeting competition"
were met. 340 U.S. at 250. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d
786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952) ; Standard Brands, Inc., 189
F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951).
151. See notes 150 supra, 152-6 infra.
152. See 340 U.S. at 242, 249, 250; Samuel H. Moss v. FTC, 155 F2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1946).
153. For FTC recognition of this factor, see FTC v. Standard Brands, 189 F2d 510,
513 n.7 (2d Cir. 1951); Minneapolis-Honeyw'ell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396-7
(1948), rev'd, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952).
154. 340 U.S. at 238, 242, 244, 246, 247 n.14, 250.
155. Id. at 231, 247 n.14. The FTC, subsequent to the Supreme Court decision, once
more took up the cudgels against Standard Oil of Indiana, invalidating its "meeting com-
petition" defense apparently on grounds of insufficient "good faith." Modified Order 43S9,
March 28, 1952, partly quoted in FTC Release, March 29, 1952.
156. See FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); Dean Milt:
Co. v. American Processing & Sales Co., 1950-51 Tn=E CAsEs [ 62,777 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
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stringency assumed the protective character of criminal prosecutions 157 With
the advent of the Federal Rules, however, new court attitudes have arisen.
Complaints may now be short and simple fact statements 15s which must serve
only to (1) inform the court of its jurisdiction,'" and (2) enable defendants
to prepare responsive pleadings. 60 Consequently, under current pleading
rules, plaintiffs can initiate suits with little specific evidence. 101
Once pleadings are filed, the Federal Rules authorize depositions, inter-
rogatories, and motions to produce documents, 0 2 thus permitting private
litigants to engage in extensive "fishing expeditions." 1 3 Boundaries for the
evidence hunt are set only by liberal judicial standards of relevancy 104 and
undue hardship,165 and by the ability of plaintiffs to finance discovery.110 But
157. See Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 284, 297 mn.85-8 (1939).
158. See FE. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The complaint need not state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action. Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419' (8th Cir. 1942); Camrel Co. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 57 F.
Supp. 811 (D. N.J. 1944). For the bareness of pleadings now acceptable see, e.g., Shoup
Voting Machine Corp. v. Lipsky, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 11 62,539 (N.D. Il. 1949); Rivoll
Operating Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 219 (W.D. N.Y. 1947). But the complainant
must make some allegations of fact. Floyd v. Gage, 192 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1951).
159. See cases cited note 158 supra.
160. See, e.g., Commercial Laundry, Inc. v. Linen Supply Ass'n of Greater New
York, 1948-49 TRADE CASES 62,339 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (where several defendants, motion
to make allegations only against identifiable parties sustained) ; McCain v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 64 F.Supp. 12 (W.D. Mo. 1945) (motion for more definite statement
denied where defendants are able to prepare responsive pleadings).
161. "[A]nybody who feels that he has been treated wrongly for a few dollars can
file one of those complaints in 10 minutes .... [I]nvestigating the case before you bring
the suit just does not happen. The investigation is made, under the Federal rules, after
you file your complaint and then you get your information." Testimony of Kenneth Royall,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Judi-
ciary Committee on H.R. 3408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 68 (1951). And see cases cited
note 158 supra. But cf. Mebco Realty Holding Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 44 F.
Supp. 591 (D. N.J. 1942) (discovery rules do not justify starting treble damage action
without stating a "good case").
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
163. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcncEs 26.15' at p. 1063 (2d ed. 1948). For the per-
missible scope of discovery, see, e.g., Benal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
1948-49 TRADE CASES 62,450 (N.D. Ill. 1949). For the frequent use of interrogatories in
private antitrust suits, see Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts,
60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1143 (1951).
164. E.g., Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 1946-47 TRADE CASES f 57,622
(D. Del. 1947).
165. See, e.g., Makan Amusement Corp. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co.,
3 F.R.D. 429 (D. N.J. 1944).
166. "I tell them [prospective suitors] that if they do not have $25,000 for the taking
of depositions under the Federal rules, at least $25,000 just for costs and transcripts and
traveling expenses, that they had better drop the suit. . . ." Testimony of Thurman Arnold,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1910, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1949). Mr. Arnold's estimate is probably exceptional since one commentary,
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while liberal discovery provisions are a boon to plaintiff's evidence procure-
ment, they possess one significant drawback: in the hands of some defendants,
exhaustive inquiry may be turned upon plaintiffs as weapons of delay and
harrassment'L67
Intervention. To minimize the proof and cost burdens of independent pri-
vate litigation, private parties frequently seek to secure injunctive relief by
intervening in government antitrust actions.'Ls Since government decrees
often affect the competitive status of many non-participants in government
suits, private parties have attempted to assert an interest and participate in
decree formulation, modification, or enforcement, either to secure favorable
decree provisions '19 or to compel compliance with a decree already entered. °
However, private parties cannot intervene "of right."'17 And while inter-
making a survey, sets $20,000 as abnormally high. See Comment, 59 YMX LJ. 117, 128
(1949). The practicability of discovery may also be curtailed by deliberate delay in re-
sponses, see Hearings. supra. at 3, or the length of time necessary to complete discovery,
see, e.g., Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951) (depositions likely to extend over one year).
167. "They asked for his files... and then the lawyer ... began going through 7,00
letters line by line, asking what was meant by that... The interrogatories fall into some
15 divisions.., and the small-business concern is called upon to answer some 17,00D ques-
tions, which would absorb its whole staff for a great deal more than a year.., ' Testi-
mony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Study of Mo:opoly
Power of the House Judiciary Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 290-91 (1949). For
excellent discussion of abuse of discovery, see Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of
Depositions wnder the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949). The author concludes that
whereas abuse is not widespread, its most frequent occurrence is in complex litigation such
as antitrust suits. Id. at 127. See also Speck, Use of Discovry in United States District
Courts, 60 YALE L. J. 1132, 1152-3 (1951). Courts have taken some steps in antitrust suits
to meet abuses. See, e.g., Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 11 F.R.
D. 156, 15S (S.D. N.Y. 1951) (sidestepping the usual procedure of priority of discovery
for the one first requesting it; instead providing alternate examination periods).
163. Intervention is governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 24. Private suitors may not enforce
government decrees through provisions of FED. R. Crv. P. 71, permitting a person, not a
party to an action, to enforce orders made in his favor. See United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 75 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (government decree not made "in favor
of' non-party suitor and power of court to enforce is limited to parties by the terms of
the decree).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73 (S.D. N.Y.
1949) (unsuccessful attempt to have terms of consent decree operate to prevent institution
of suits against intervenors for collection of royalties) ; Partmar Corporation v. United
States, 338 U.S. 804 (1949) (unsuccessful attempt to secure injunction against restrictive
contracts in distribution and use of movie films, and to secure particular divestiture).
170. See e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 75 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y.
1948) (unsuccessful attempt to have motion picture exhibitors and distributors adjudged
in contempt of government decree) ; United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 7 F.R.D.
336 (D. Del. 1947) (successful attempt to obtain license under decree provision authoriz-
ing defendants to grant licenses at reasonable royalties).
171. Since § 16 of the Clayton Act gives no statutory right to intervene in government
antitrust actions, Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137
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vention is discretionary, 72 courts are reluctant to grant it. When parties
seek favorable decree provisions through participation in decree formulation
or modification, courts generally deny intervention to prevent "interference"
with the overall relief sought by the government.173 And although some courts
permit intervention after decrees are entered where the decree specifically
authorizes private participation, 174 others may even strike the authorization
in order to block private intervention. 75 As long as courts interpret the exist-
ence of the independent private antitrust action as indicating a Congressional
intent to separate private and government litigation, 176 private parties' attempts
to intervene in government suits will most likely fail.
Class action and Joinder. Courts do permit plaintiffs to pool resources through
"spurious" class actions or permissive joinder.177 Since the "spurious" class
action adjudicates only for those before the court, it has the same effect as
(1944), and since parties rarely have property in the hands of the court, most attempts
of private suitors to intervene "of right" have been based on FE. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2),
permitting intervention where a party is bound by a judgment and is inadequately repre-
sented. Courts have uniformly held that private suitors fulfill neither of the requirements.
See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., supra; United States v.
ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. 511 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F.
Supp. 165 (D. N.J. 1950).
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) provides for permissive intervention where (1) there is
a conditional statutory right to intervene; or (2) a question of law or fact common with
the issue before the court. Since there is no statutory right to intervene, private suitors
seek to invoke FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (2).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73 (S.D. N.Y.
1949) ; and cases cited note 171 supra.
174. See, e.g., consent decree provisions authorizing private parties to apply to court
in United States v. Hartford Empire Co., 65 F.Supp. 271, 276 (D. Ohio 1946) and United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.Supp. 513, 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1945). In United States v.
Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 7 F.R.D. 336 (D. Del. 1947), where a government judgment
required defendants to grant licenses at reasonable royalties, the decree did not specifi-
cally authorize intervention but the court had retained jurisdiction and granted a private
suitor's petition to intervene for a license. The court asserted that jurisdiction had been re-
tained for that purpose and noted that more recent similar decrees contained specific au-
thorizations. While private suitors have attempted to utilize the Vehicular Parkifg case as
authority for intervention generally, they have failed. See, e.g., United States v. Bendix
Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 75 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
175. See United States v. Technicolor, Inc., Civil No. 7507-WM, S.D. Cal.,
cited in TImBERG, THE ANTIRusr LAws FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A GOVZRNMENT
ATTORNEY 41 (1949).
176. E.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F.Supp. 165, 168-9 (D. N.J.
1950) ; United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 76 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 75 F.Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). Of
course, courts may deny intervention simply to avoid delay and confusion. Allen Calcula-
tors, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944).
177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (joinder), 23(a) (3) (spurious class action).
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permissive joinder.'7 8 For use of either device, plaintiffs must demonstrate
a "common question of law or fact." In addition, the "spurious" class suit
requires that "common relief" be sought, and for joinder, injuries must arise
from the "same transaction or series of transactions." 170 Recently, in Kainz
v. Anlzeuser-Busch, s0 the Seventh Circuit definitely upheld "spurious"
class suits and permissive joinder for private antitrust claimants. Liquor
retailers had sued their supplier under the Robinson-Patman Act for dis-
crimination in prices and services in favor of other retailers. Reversing the
district court's dismissal of both class action and joinder,1 s ' the Seventh
Circuit held that (1) individual damage claims, although differing in amounts,
were requests for the same type of relief and thus fulfilled the "common
relief" requirement of the class suit ;182 and (2) even though violations arose
from different transactions between retailers and Anheuser-Busch, the alleged
discrimination lasting over a three year period presented a "common question
of law and fact" arising from the same series of transactions.'83 Thus, while
each party must of course still prove the cause and amount of his individual
injury,"8' antitrust plaintiffs may freely join forces in litigation to gain the
advantages of pooled testimony and avoid duplication of cost and effort.185
178. Schatte v. International Alliance etc., 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Weeks
v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F2d 84, 88-90 (7th Cir. 1941). And see 3 Moon, FEMz.u PRAc-
TICE ff 23.10 at pp. 3442, 3465 (2d ed. 1948).
179. See note 177 supra. There is no right, however, to bring suit on behalf of the
public interest. E.g., Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F.Supp. 325 (N.D.
IlL 1948). And while the "common question" itself creates the class, 3 'Mco.u&, op. cit.
supra note 178, at 3443, plaintiff must adequately represent the class. See, e.g., WVeC:s
v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941) (class action dismissed for inadequate repre-
sentation) ; Rio Haven, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 11 F.R.D. Mq9 (E.D. Pa.
1951) (class action dismissed when record shows members of class whose interests are
antagonistic to plaintiff's). But dismissal of the class suit does not dismiss plaintiff's per-
sonal claim. Farmers' Cooperative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (Sth
Cir. 1942).
180. 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
181. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1950-51 TRADS CAsEs r0 62,928 (N.D. 11. 1951),
Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 860 (1952) (separate transactions between dealers and defendant
seller do not constitute a "common question of law or fact"; differing amounts in damages
claimed do not constitute "common relief" sought). Shortly afterward, the district court
dismissed another class action on identical grounds. See Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co.,
99 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (action by 87 independent shoe repairmen and whole-
salers of shoe repair items against manufacturer suppliers for discriminatory pricing).
182. 194 F.2d at 743. In so ruling, the court criticized Farmers' Cooperative Oil Co.
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (Sth Cir. 1942) (differing damage claims do not
constitute "common relief" sought) as nullifying class action provisions for all except
injunction suits. For additional criticism see 3 Moom., op. cit. supra note 178, at 3455.
183. 194 F.2d at 743.
184. See, e.g., Alabama Independent Service Station Association, Inc. v. Shell Petrol-
eum Corp., 28 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1938).
185. Once a class action is begun, additional parties may intervene, providing they
meet requirements for suit. See, e.g., Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 9 F.R.D.
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Veme and Forum Non Conveniens
Special antitrust venue privileges permit plaintiffs to cut costs by a
judicious choice of venue from many possible forums. Litigants may sue in
any district where the "defendant resides or is found or has an agent."'
Plaintiffs' forum selection is further widened by interpretations of other
statutes that permit suit where corporations are licensed to do business, even
though no actual business is done.
1 8 7
Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, 18 however, may frustrate plaintiff's
choice of forum. Held applicable to private antitrust litigation,18 0 1404(a)
permits defendants to move for transfer to another district on grounds of
"convenience of parties and witnesses" or in "the interests of justice."100
677 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). The difficulty of counsel's handling a large group and bars against
counsel's solicitation of all parties able to intervene may impede the utility of class actions,
Counsel, however, may suggest that complaining parties themselves organize a solicitation
committee. For discussion of the usefulness of class action and joinder in private antitrust
suits, see Daniel, Enforcement of the Sherman Act by Actions for Treble Damages, 34
VA. L. REv. 901, 924-5 (1948). But see the scepticism of the court in Kainz v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d at 794 (voluminous proceedings, complicated issues).
186. See note 1 supra. In addition, Clayton's § 12 gives private suitors wide leeway
for venue and service against corporations: "[A]ny suit, action, or proceeding under
the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts
business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §22 (1946).
The provisions of § 12 do not apply to service of process on partnerships. Kapleau v.
Cohen, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 62,820 (D. Conn. 1951). And service on a wholly owned
subsidiary will not be held service on the parent corporation under § 12. E.g., Pfeiffer v.
United Booking Office, Inc., 93 F.Supp. 363 (N.D. Ill. 1950) (if the subsidiary cannot
bind the parent contractually, and the parent does not do business in the jurisdiction) ;
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 10 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (parent regis-
tered to do business, but did none). For antitrust suit interpretations of "being found" or
"transacting business" see, e.g., Schiller v. Mit Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1950) ;
Windsor Theatre Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 79 F.Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1948); Winkler-Koch Engi-
neering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 70 F.Supp. 77 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
187. 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1950). See Bertha Building
Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 20 U.S.L. WEEK 2387 (E.D. Ky. 1952); Lipp v. Na-
tional Screen Service Co., 95 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
188. 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)(Supp. 1950).
189. Clayton's special venue provisions do not exempt antitrust litigants from the
operation of § 1404(a), United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949), al-
though prior to the passage of § 1404(a), forum no); convenienm had been held inapplicable
to antitrust litigation, United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948). Preselt
proposed legislation would amend § 12 of the Clayton Act to prevent transfer of actions
without the consent of the plaintiff. See report of H.R. 6157 in 20 U.S.L. Wnaic 2321
(Jan. 29, 1952). For application of § 1404 (a) to antitrust litigation, see Note, 58 Yai L.J.
482 (1949). For general interpretation of the section, consult Notes, 60 Y=UE L. J. 183
(1951), 60 YALE L.J. 537 (1951).
190. In considering transfer, courts weigh the location of parties, witnesses, and evi-
dence; facilitation of a speedy trial; and hardships on parties. See, e.g., Glassfloss Corp.
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While decisions conflict on whether transfer may be made to a district where
venue would not have been proper, 9 1 the recent Third Circuit holding in
Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Rodney 102 validates such transfer where venue
is proper for some defendants, and the others waive the issue. However,
1404(a) cannot be used to bar suit by defendant's transfer to a forum with
a shorter statute of limitations. Where limitations bar suits in the requested
forum, courts either deny the transfer '9 3 or construe the request for transfer
as a vaiver of statute of limitation defenses in the new forum.1"" In any
event, courts require a strong showing of "convenience" to defeat antitrust
plaintiffs' special venue privileges. 9 5 On the other hand, a recent Second
Circuit interpretation of 1404(a), holding that plaintiff cannot effect trans-
fer to a forum in which he could not have served defendant with process, 00
has practically destroyed forum non conveniens as an aid to plaintiff's liti-
gation strategy.
Prior Litigation
Private plaintiffs receive special statutory aid through provisions authorizing
use of prior government judgments or decrees against defendants. Section 5 of
the Clayton Act permits treble damage plaintiffs to introduce final judgments
or decrees rendered in government antitrust actions against the same defen-
dants, as prima facie evidence of all issues determined in the prior adjudi-
cation.197  In addition, § 5 suspends limitation periods on private suits
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 90 F.Supp. 967 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; Greve v. Gibraltar
Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949) : Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 85 F.Supp. 319 (D. Del. 1949).
191. E.g., comnpare Hampton Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
90 F.Supp. 645 (D.D.C. 1950), with Glassfloss Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
90 F.Supp. 967 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). Cf. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F.Supp. 45 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950). And see 3 MooRa, FEmERAa. PPAcricE 19.04, pp. 2138-9, n.87 (2d ed. 1948)
for the umequivocal statement that venue in the district to which transfer is requested must
be proper.
192. 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951).
193. E.g., Fifth & Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F.Supp. 64 (S.D. N.Y. 1948)
(motion to dismiss under forum. now coniecns denied where defendant's tardy objection
has caused limitations to expire in the convenient forum).
194. E.g., Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949)
(defendant required, as a precondition to transfer, to waive limitation issue).
195. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ford 'Motor Co., 89 F.Supp. 45 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
196. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Note, C0 Ya I.J.
183 (1951). However, the broad provisions for venue under Clayton, see note 186 supra,
that initially permit plaintiff a wide choice of forum where defendant does interstate busi-
ness, mitigates the impact of the Foster-Milburn holding.
197. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1946). For discussion of Sectiun 5, see Dix.
Decrees and Judgmwnts under Section 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 30 Go. L J. 331
(1942) ; Comment, 46 Ira.. L. Ray. 765 (1951); Note, 61 YAmx L J. 417 (1952).
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while the government action is pending, and consequently allows plaintiffs
to wait in order to avail themselves of government judgments.10 8 While
prima facie aid from a judgment is usually confined to proof of violation
(since the government action rarely settled issues bearing on proof of cause
and private injury), § 5 aid may in some cases extend to proof of cause.
In a recent treble damage suit against General Motors and its financing
affiliate, for example, the Supreme Court, construing for the first time § 5's
application to a criminal antitrust judgment, held the prior judgment
against defendants determinative not only of the issue of illegal conspiracy,
but also of its "effectuation by coercion." 19 9 Thus, technically at least, plain-
tiff's causal proof was materially eased.20  In any event, however, a
§ 5 judgment does not relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of preparing his
proof nor does it shift the burden of proof; the judgment is admissible
simply as an evidentiary item that may be rebutted. 201
Despite its value in some individual suits, 20 2 § 5's utility is strictly limited
by its unavailability. Most government actions result in nolo contendere pleas
or consent decrees before testimony is taken, and thus do not provide judg-
ments that qualify under § 5.203 And when government actions are fully con-
198. See statute cited note 197 supra.
199. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1951).
200. For the effects of the Einich case in extending to proof of cause the prima facie
presumption accorded by Section 5, see Note, 61 YAIZ L. J. 417, 423-4 (1952).
201. "Being prima facie evidence, the judgment is not conclusive in this case. It is
merely sufficient evidence ... to put these defendants to their proof." Charge to the jury,
quoted in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 76 (7th Cir. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951). Once the defendant comes forward with
evidence, as he usually does, the burden of going forward shifts back to the plaintiff.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Judiciary
Committee on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1950). Consequently, from the stand-
point of trial preparation, the plaintiff must do precisely the same amount of work as if
there had been no prior judgment. Id. at 4.
202. Once a judgment is introduced, its influence on juries may go far beyond the
prima facie effect dictated in court instructions. See, e.g., Testimony of Jerrold G. Van
Cise, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Thdi-
ciary Committee on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1950) : "Today, if I can intro-
duce in evidence before a jury a Government judgment, whether you call it prima facie or
conclusive, it is going to be considered conclusive by the jury." To similar effect see
Testimony of Kenneth Royall in Hearings [before the same committee] on H.R. 3408,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1951). But see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 417, 425 n.33 (1952).
203. Consent decrees entered before testimony is taken are not admissible under
§ 5 by the terms of the section itself, 38 STAT. 731 (1941), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1946), and
courts treat pleas of nolo contendere as "consent decrees" for § 5 purposes. See, e.g.,
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F.Supp. 366, 370-9 (D. Minn. 1939), aft'd, 119
F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941). A judgment rendered on facts
stipulated for the purpose of the instant case is similarly non-admissible under the section.
Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
Of the civil cases filed between 1935 and 1950, 134 were settled by consent decree and
only 37 were tried. Timberg, Equitable Relief under the Sherman Act [1950] U. oF ILL.
L&w Fonul[ 629. 630 (1950). While no comparable statistics are available for nolo con-
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tested, trials may take years. 2o4 Moreover, a judgment does not become "final"
for § 5 purposes until appeals are exhausted and decrees are finally altered
on remand.2 5 Consequently, § 5 may assist only those who are willing
to wait out the protracted government suit. And when government action
concludes, there is still no guarantee of § 5 aid: issues ultimately settled
in the government suit may not be those crucial to plaintiff's case; 0 or the
necessary presence of some defendants in the private suit who were not
parties to the government action may altogether preclude admission of the
prior judgment.20 7
While, aside from § 5, earlier adjudications against defendants are
theoretically inadmissible,203 plaintiffs may still successfully utilize them. Pleas
of nolo contendere, for example, may be introduced for impeachment pur-
poses.20 9 And pleadings are permitted to refer to prior adjudications as "back-
tendere pleas, disposition of 38 government antitrust cases (civil and criminal) terminated
between July 1949 and June 1950 showed 17 to be nolo contendere pleas. REP. AiT'y GE!.
66 (1950). See also ANTrrausT LAYW ENFORCEMENT DY THE FaEERAL TRADE Coin.nssxo.u
AND THE ANTITRUST DivisioN, DEPAnmruxr OF JusTIcE, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1951).
204. The median time from filing to disposition for government antitrust cases M
1946-1948 was 23 months. ANNUAL REPORT or TuE DIRECTOR OF THE Am nsmATIvrv
OnCE OF THE UNITED STATES CoUTrs 1950, p. 43 (transmitted to the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Sept. 8, 1950). In certain instances, where government litigation
drags on interminably, § 5 may be completely futile. See, e.g., the United Slates Steel
case, filed in 1911 and decided in 1920; the International Harester case, filed in 1918
and finally decided in 1927; the Ahaniumm case, instituted in 1937, and final juris-
diction rests with the court until 1955. See ANTITRUST Lw ENoncrMENT BY Tim FERo-
AL TRADE CoMMIussION AND THE ANTITRUST DIrsoN, DEPART'.MENT OF JUSTICE H.P.
REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1951).
205. See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F.Supp. 366, 368 (D. Minn.
1939), aff'd, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (judgment of
trial court not "final" when appeal pending) ; Fifth & Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 176
F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 894 (1949) (decree remanded for modifi-
cation of relief not "final"). But see Deluxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 95
F.Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (decree remanded).
206. The usefulness of the government judgment of course rests on its relevance to
the plaintiff's cause of action. See, e.g., Sager Glove Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
149 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1945) (striking reference to irrelevant government action from com-
plaint); Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F.Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1948)
(same).
207. Applebaum v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., Civil No. 373, S.D. Miss., July 16,
1951, unreported, cited in McDonald, P'roof of Conspiracy: the Prima Fade Rule, address
delivered before the Section on Antitrust Law of the New York State Bar Association,
dated January 23, 1952, mimeographed copy in Yale Law Library.
208. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918) (govern-
ment judgment rendered prior to passage of § 5 inadmissible in private antitrust suit).
209. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) (new trial ordered
where court excluded indictment and sentence under nolo contendere plea in prior govern-
ment antitrust action of defendant corporation's only witness). The holding is criticized
in Notes, 2 RUTGras L. REv. 178 (1948), 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 777 (1949).
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ground" material.2 10 Moreover, courts' factual determinations may also be
influenced in plaintiff's favor: frequent references in court opinions to de-
fendants' prior defeats indicate that previous decisions are not without
effects. 211 In some cases, prior judgments, unqualified under § 5, come in
through the back door of judicial notice: in the recent Milgram v. Locn/s,
Inc. decision,212 for example, the Third Circuit, over a vehement dissent,
took notice of defendant's defeat in the government litigation against the
movie industry as indicating its "proclivity" to violate the antitrust laws.-18
However, other courts may rebel against sly interjection of prior decisions
and bar them as prejudicial to defendants. 21 4  But even with these doors
closed, prior adjudications may still aid plaintiffs' proof through the operation
of stare decisis, since previous decisions may, without burden on plaintiffs,
settle difficult questions of law.
Entirely aside from the influence of judgments, prior actions through
revelation of information lessen the proof obstacles of treble damage claim-
ants. While FTC and Antitrust Division files are not open to private liti-
gants' inspection,215 their contents nevertheless spill out in government liti-
gation. Actions not only reveal violations to prospective plaintiffs,210 but
210. See, e.g., Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 80 F.Supp. 800 (D.
Del. 1948); Sinaiko Brothers Coal & Oil Co. v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.
N.Y. 1942).
211. See, e.g., Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 1948-49 TRADE
CASES ff 62,437 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) (motion for summary judgment denied; reference to
prior judgment against defendant as "probably establishing a violation') ; Theatre Invest-
ment Co. v. RKO-Radio Pictures, 72 F.Supp. 650, 653 (D. Wash. 1947) (Paramount case
mentioned as "on all 4's"). And although an FTC order is inadmissible under § 5,
see, e.g., Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d
69 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945), it may influence courts as well. See
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 991, 994-5 (8th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (court notes cease and desist order against defendant
"in passing" and later quotes from same). And see cases cited note 213 infra.
212. 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951).
213. "The past proclivity of these defendants to unlawful conduct may be of some
significance here. ... Viewing the facts of this case in the light of the specific finding in
the Paramount case, the inference of conspiracy here is strengthened." Id. at 584. The
decree had apparently been excluded by the district court. See id. at 593 n.5. For other
references to Paramount's "proclivity" to violate, see Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo
Theatres, Inc., 190 F.2d 951, 958 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Benal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 726, 735 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
214. Cf. cases cited note 206 supra, striking irrelevant and prejudicial portions of
complaints.
215. See Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 14; Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra
note 202, at 5.
216. The story of Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, Inc,, 170 F.2d 569
(9th Cir. 1948) provides a classic example of the way government actions reveal viola-
tions and potential evidence to private suitors. See Hearings befnre a Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 ei seq. (1949). The
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also provide valuable sources of information. In addition, prior suits save
private time and effort by schooling subsequent litigants in tested pleading
and trial techniques.217 Prior private actions may, of course, serve the same
function.
IMIPACT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTION
The impact of the private action is primarily a variable of the ability and
willingness of parties to sue. Initially, the prospect of halting injury and/or
securing lucrative recoveries and reimbursement for attorney fees stimulates
parties to act. But high costs, difficult evidence problems, and fear of trade
reprisals may counterbalance these incentives to suit. From the interplay of
these curbs and incentives private antitrust attacks emerge in completely
unpredictable fashion.
MAoie Ind stry
Movie cases comprise over 25 per cent of the total private suits in the
past eight years 218 and the ratio is currently rising.2 10  Generally, movie
litigation follows a stock pattern established by successful government and
private actions under the Sherman Act: local exhibitors sue national film
distributors (who may also own local theatres) alleging, among other things,
that defendants in combination refused to grant plaintiff first run films, or
origin of movie litigation shows a similar dependence upon the publicity value of prior
government actions. See testimony of Thurman Arnold, id. at 38; letter from Louis Nizer,
id. at 43-4. The extent to which private suits follow successful government actions is a
clear index of their value for potential private litigants. See p. 100 infra.
217. "Cases brought in widely separated parts of the country have... [complaints]
exactly the same including typographical errors .... There are cases where an ex-Justice
attorney injects in his civil case the very decree in the Government antitrust case in which
... [he] previously appeared for the Government." Testimony of Kenneth Royall, Hear-
ings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 44-5. For publishers' circularization of attorneys with
successful briefs, pleadings, etc., see ibid.
218. The estimate is based on reported suits (official and unofficial) from 1944 to 1951.
See Appendix II, p. 1064 in !ra.
219. Of the 367 private antitrust suits (excluding patent litigation and counterclaims)
pending in United States District Courts in June 1951, see Appendix I, p. 1063 infra, 129
cases were pending against the movie industry, see Hearings on H.R. 3408, mspra note
202, at 109-11, thus making the latest available ratio of movie litigation to total private
suits approximately 33%. The present jump of private suits to beyond the 150 mark, see
Report of conversation with Sidney Schreiber, counsel for the Motion Picture Association
of America, dated April 18, 1952, in Yale Law Library, suggests that today's ratio may
be even higher. However, since a considerable portion of movie litigation occurs in Illinois,
see, e.g., Variety, December 5, 1951, p. 5, col. 3 (31 suits pending in the Northern Dis-
trict alone), the ratio may be cut by the recent decision in Hoskins Coal & Dack Corp. v.
Truax Traer Coal Co., 191 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denicd, 72 Sup. Ct. (1952),
holding a 2 year statute of limitations applicable to private antitrust suits. Sce note
134 supra.
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supplied plaintiff with other films only after unreasonable "clearances." 20
Plaintiffs demonstrate injury by measuring their profits against those of
comparably situated theatres receiving the desired films or "clearance, ' 221
and generally seek to infer defendants' illegal combination from their uniform
treatment of the plaintiff.222 And, wherever possible, plaintiffs invoke § 5
of the Clayton Act to introduce the prior government decree 223 against
distributors to assist in establishing defendants' Sherman Act offense.
Local exhibitors have been eminently successful in their actions against
film distributors. Plaintiffs have secured injunctions or damages in over fifty
per cent of reported movie cases in which final disposition occurred,
22 4
the damage awards ranging from $60,000 to $1,125,000.225 And the high
220. See, e.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951)
(run) ; Theatre Investment Corp. v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 72 F.Supp. 650 (W.D.
Wash. 1947) (clearance). Other charges include fixing admission prices through film
licensing agreements, e.g., ibid.; block booking, e.g., Garbose v. Giles Co., 183 F.2d 513
(1st Cir. 1950). While the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs have been movie exhibitors,
on some occasions others have sued film distributors and producers. See e.g., N.Y. Times,
January 4, 1952, p. 18, col. 2 (suits by Screenwriters' Guild against film companies charg-
ing that anti-communist employment policy constitutes an illegal conspiracy) ; Camrel Co.
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 1944-45 TRADE CASES 1 57,233 (S.D. N.Y. 1944)
(lessor of theatre for reduced rental and market value of theatre due to deprivation of first
run film); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 1 62,911 (W.D. Ark.
1951) (prospective purchaser of theatre for inability to buy because of conspiracy). And
while defendants have usually been the major film producers and distributors, some attacks
have been levied at independent theatre chains, see e.g., Auburn Capitol Theatre Corp. v.
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 83 F.Supp. 872 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), and manufacturers of
movie advertising accessories, see Lawlor & Pantzer v. National Screen Service Corp.,
99 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
221. See movie cases cited note 97 supra.
222. See e.g., Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951); Theatres Invest-
ment Co. v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 72 F.Supp. 650 (W.D. Wash. 1947). While courts,
in some instances, have willingly made inferences of conspiracy from uniform action of
defendants in their treatment of the plaintiff, see cases cited siupra, the uniformity has been
frequently justified as arising from defendants' natural business responses. See, e.g.,
Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951); Fan-
chon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 184 (S.D. Cal. 1951); McLendon
v. Loew's, Inc., 1948-49 TRADE CASES 62,234 (N.D. Tex. 1948).
223. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 FSupp. 323 (S.D. N.Y. 1946),
70 F.Supp. 53 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), modified and remanded 334 U.S. 131 (1948), 85 F.Supp.
881 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
224. Of the 43 cases against film distributors and producers appearing in official and
unofficial reports from 1944 to the present, 17 have gone to final disposition with judg-
ment for plaintiff in nine and judgment for defendant in eight.
225. Reported cases in which damages, attorney fees, or injunctions were awarded
are: Applebaum v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASES f[ 62,944 (S.D. Miss.
1951) ($150,000 damages; $40,000 fees); Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317
(3d Cir. 1948), (remanded for damages and injunction), 81 F.Supp. 212 (W.D. Pa. 1948)
(injunction), modified, 176 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1949); Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictureg,
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degree of plaintiff success warrants the inference that favorable settlements
are frequent as well.226 But insofar as numerical plaintiff victories are con-
cerned, past litigation may present only a preview of coming events, for
claims against the movie industry are currently rising to new heights. In
successive years prior to 1951 pending suits had totaled 100, with roughly
fifteen suits being terminated and commencing each year.2 T By June of 1951,
however, industry spokesmen reported 129 cases pending; and by April of
1952, pending suits had climbed beyond the 150 mark.2
Individually, successful private suits have secured alteration of movie
industry practices. Many private actions concern illegal practices that have
generally ceased since the government litigation, and consequently serve
primarily to compensate injured plaintiffs. But even here, plaintiff victories
definitively adjudicate a specific theatre's right to first run film or shorter
clearance periods. 22 0  Other private suits seek to determine similar rights
Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) ($360,000 damages), 1946-47 TRsn CAsES 1157,475 (N.D. Ill.
1946) (injunction), af'd, 162 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1947), enforced, 78 F.Supp. 250 (N.D.
Ill. 1948), aff'd, 170 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc., v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949) ($35,500 damages, $19,000 fees) ; Brook-
side Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 194 F2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952)
($1,125,000 damages; $100,000 fees) ; Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951)
(injunction) ; Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951) ($941,-
000 damages; $75,000 fees; injunction) ; Theatre Investment Co. v. RKO-Radio Pictures,
Inc., 72 F.Supp. 650 (D. Wash. 1947) ($60,000 damages; injunction); William Goldman
Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1945) (remanded for damages and in-
junction), 69 F.Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ($075,000 damages; injunction), aff'd 164 F2d
1021 (3d Cir. 1948).
226. Because the movie industry is flooded with claims, see p. 1046 inf ra, with frequent
plaintiff victories and high cost of defense, see pp. 1046, 1059-60 fifra, it is evident that movie
defendants are more willing to settle than are defendants in other antitrust litigation. The
proclivity to settlement is amply borne out by attempts to establish arbitration systems in the
industry: "Distrib lawyers reported that the volume of such antitrust contests is steadily
increasing despite an extensive effort to induce exhibitors to try arbitration rather than
engage in costly litigation." Variety, December 5, 1951, p. 5, col. 3. Apparently a recent
attempt to establish arbitration shows more promise. See Variety, April 23, 1952, p. 3, col.
3. However, arbitration may suffer a setback if courts follow the holding in Mission
Theatres, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 1950-51 TADE CAsEs 1162,702 (NV.
D. Mo. 1950) (determination that "clearance" is reasonable by arbitration tribunal is not
res judicata in court attack). But the decision may be distinguished on the grounds that
there plaintiff's predecessors and not the plaintiff were parties to the arbitration. For
recommendations on arbitration to settle movie disputes, see testimony of Abram F. M1yers,
Hearings on H.R. 3408, szpra note 202, at 120 et seq.
227. Variety, December 5, 1951, p. 5, col. 3.
228. See note 219 supra.
229. And once the adjudication is effected, continued violations permit the suitor
access to the court for injunction (if not already granted), e.g., Bigelow v. RKO-Radio
Pictures, Inc., 162 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1947) and contempt proceedings, e.g., Bigelow v.
RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 78 F.Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1943), aff'd, 170 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.
1948).
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where exhibitors are still in unfavored playing positions.23 0 And drive-in
theatres, once excluded from the recently adopted system of competitive
bidding for first run film, have newly secured the right to bid. 231 The
exclusion of suburban theatres has similarly been halted. 232
Successful private movie litigation also influences industry compliance
with provisions of government decrees. Government decrees against film
distributors and producers establish a new code of business for the movie
industry.23 3 While laurels for industry adherence to these new standards
cannot be neatly apportioned to defendants' good faith or threats of future
government and private suits, it is clear the private actions play a significant
role in inducing compliance.2 34 Terrific financial punishment meted out in
costs of defending litigation 235 and huge freshly won damage awards 230
plus the spectre of over $350,000,000 worth of current claims against de-
fendants 237 are potent reminders of prohibited conduct.
Oil Industry
Major oil producers have also been subject to a substantial number of
private attacks.238 The successful 1940 government prosecution in United
States v. Socony-Vacuum 239 set off well over forty private suits against oil
companies, with each plaintiff gasoline distributor repeating the proven
230. See, e.g., Windsor Theater Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 189 F.2d 797 (4th
Cir. 1951); Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal.
1951); Mission Theatres, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 1950-51 TRADE
CASES 62,702 (W.D. Mo. 1950). And see Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 84.
231. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951). And see South Bend
Drive-in Theatre Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 TRADE CASES ff 62,486 (N.D.
Ill. 1949) (motion to produce documents).
232. Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 194 F.2d 846
(8th Cir. 1952). But cf. Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 84
(S.D. Cal. 1951).
233. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 179 (1948).
234. "Since the movie companies were in litigation, for instance, they are very much
in favor of eliminating this triple-damage provision .... [Because of the triple damage
suit] we see a real cooperative effort on the part of the movie industry to try to be
cautious ... to be sure that they do not violate an antitrust law." Testimony of Graham
H. Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Hearings
on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 12.
235. "Indicating the costs involved is the fact that Universal alone sets aside $400,000
every three months for its defense of the various antitrust charges. Companies figure that
merely the paper work involved in each suit, excluding any possible damage awards, sets
them back $25,000." Variety, December 5, 1951, p. 5, col. 3. For costs of defense generally
see p. 1059 infra.
236. See cases cited note 225 supra.
237. See Variety, April 23, 1952, p. 14, col. 1.
238. Suits against major oil companies comprise about 6% of the total private suits
from 1944 to 1951. See Appendix II, p. 1064 infra.
239. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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government charge that companies, by concertedly buying up "distress"
gasoline in the market, had pegged prices in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.2 40 However, in sharp contrast to movie litigation, for example,
the series of actions following the Socony decision resoundingly flopped. Plain-
tiffs were unable to meet the newly formulated court tests requiring the
showing that increased costs of gas had not been passed on to customers.
2 4 1
Aside from the ill-fated price fixing suits immediately following the Socony-
Vacuum case, oil companies have been victims of other frequent claims
pressed by gas station operators. Generally, charges have been levelled at
plaintiff's owna suppliers for price fixing,24-  price discrimination,24 3 or the
tying of other products to sales of gas.2 4 Other private suits have struck the
suppliers of competitors for alleged "predatory pricing" in local retail gas
wars.2 45 While most complaints have been upheld, station operators have
met considerable difficulty in alleging facts that fulfill antitrust "commerce'
requirements: the local market in which gas retailers operate 2 0 or the
240. See, e.g., cases cited note 85 supra. In Clark Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
56 F.Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944), aff'd, 148 F2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
734 (1945), 16 companion cases were, by stipulation, concluded with the instant decision;
and in Farmers' Cooperative Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F.Supp. 735 (N.D.
Iowa 1942), aff'd, 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942), an association of distributors unsuccess-
fully attempted a representative action for its 700 members. Apparently, sporadic attacks
based on the 1940 Socony case are still being levelled against oil companies at this late
date. See, e.g., McClain v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 261 (W.D. Mo. 1950)
(motion for separation of issues).
241. See p. 1023 supra; cases cited note 239 supra.
242. E.g., McCain v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 64 F.Supp. 12 (,.D. Mo. 1945) (prices
fixed so low the plaintiff forced to operate at a loss).
243. E.g., Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1937) (complaint
upheld in part); Tann v. Standard Oil Co., 1950-51 TRADE CAsEs 1162,900 (N.D. Ill.
1951) (motion on interrogatories); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 93 F.Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal.
1951) (dismissed); Nachman v. Shell Oil Co., 1944-45 TRAE CAsES 1157,361 (D. Md.
1945) (verdict for defendant) ; Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.Supp. 547 (N.D. IM. 1943)
(dismissed) ; Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F.Supp. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1942) (com-
plaint upheld); Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F.Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941)
(complaint upheld); Alabama Independent Service Station Association, Inc. ". Shell
Petroleum Corp., 28 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939) (complaint upheld).
244. E.g., Munson v. Richfield Oil Corp., 91 F.Supp. 171 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (complaint
upheld).
245. E.g., Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F.Supp. 403 (D. Conn. 1950) (judgment for de-
fendant). Close gasoline retail competition has also produced suits among competitors,
e.g., Dunkel Oil Corp. v. Anich, 1944-45 TRADE CAsEs 1 57,306 (E.D. Il. 1944) (boycott
to keep competitor closed nights and force his prices up; dismissed). Other charges have
been levelled at large oil companies for monopolization of oil production, see e.g., Coast
v. Hunt Oil Co., 20 U.S.L. W= 2494 (5th Cir. April 10, 1952) (dismissal affirmed), and
for discrimination in deliveries, see e.g., Stephenson v. Sun Oil Co., Civil No. 280S9
(N.D. Ohio, pending).
246. See, e.g., Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 93 F.Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal 1951); Dunh-el Oil
Corp. v. Anich, 1944-45 TRADE CASES f 57,306 (E.D. Ill. 1944).
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location of suppliers' refineries and storage plants in plaintiff's own state 247
are frequent grounds for dismissal of suit.
Automobile Distribution
Automobile manufacturers have faced sporadic attacks by private suitors
claiming illegal revocation of auto distribution franchises. 248 In 1941, the
Justice Department obtained a criminal conviction against General Motors
and GMAC, its financing subsidiary, for "conspiring" to coerce auto dealers
to finance exclusively through GMAC.240 Franchise revocation was one of
the major means of coercion. 2r0 Plaintiffs, in the flurry of private suits in-
duced by the government action, were uniformly unsuccessful. 25 1 In the
seven suits against General Motors, for example, only four plaintiffs reached
juries.252 The one plaintiff jury verdict was subsequently reversed by the
Seventh Circuit, which in turn was reversed by the Supreme Court, and a
new trial was ordered.25 3 No subsequent action has occurred.
254
Patents
Private antitrust suits frequently involve patents.25 While the monopoly
conferred by a patent is itself immune from antitrust proscriptions, patent
247. See oil cases cited'note 38 supra.
248. Suits in the automobile industry comprise about 6% of the total private suits from
1944 to 1951. See Appendix II, p. 1064 infra.
249. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
250. Id. at 398.
251. With the exception of a plaintiff's judgment in the Emich case which was subse.
quently reversed, see -note 253 infra, reported decisions fail to show a single successful stilt
against automobile manufacturers and distributors. See, e.g., F.L. Mendez & Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Reidley v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 82 F.
Supp. 8 (D. Ky. 1949). Apparently, in the absence of an "interstate" conspiracy, such as
that found in the General Motors case, auto manufacturers and distributors are generally
insulated from private antitrust attack for cancellation of franchises or discrimination of
various kinds because of plaintiff local dealer's usual inability to show any injurious effects
on the public automobile market. See, e.g., Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519
(10th Cir. 1950) ; Hill v. Linton, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 62,683 (N.D. Ill. 1950) ; Reldley
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., supra.
252. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Henry F. Herbermann, attorney
for General Motors Corp., dated December 28, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
253. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950), revd,
340 U.S. 558 (1951) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 417 (1952).
254. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Henry F. Herbermann, attorney for
General Motors Corp., dated December 28, 1951, in Yale Law Library. Despite plaintiffs'
failures in the General Motors cases, defendants were forced to make considerable financial
outlay. With the exception of one case which never ran beyond pleading stages, cost of
defense ran "into six figures" for each suit. In the Emich case itself, defendant introduced
testimony of over 200 witnesses from all parts of the country, and, of course, the cost of
bringing them to the place of trial was "tremendous." Ibid.
255. Claims involving patents represent about 17% of the total private suits from
1944 to 1951. See Appendix II, p. 1064 infra.
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holders may nevertheless use it in ways that violate the antitrust laws.
Private suits against such abuse have primarily been directed at: (1) licens-
ing agreements that illegally fix prices 256 or force other products on licen-
sees, 2 7 or prevent licensees from using other goods competing with the
licensed item ;2"s (2) the threatening or bringing of infringement suits against
competitors or their customers where patents do not in fact extend to items
sued upon ;259 and (3) the pooling of patent rights to create combinations
in restraint of trade.2 ,0 Of course, claimants may themselves initiate anti-
trust actions for illegal patent use; but just as often, antitrust attack arises
as a counter-claim to patent holders' suits for infringement or royalties.20
Here, since defenses may raise complex issues of patent validity and scope
256. E.g., Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D. N.Y.
1950) (complaint upheld); National Nut Co. of California v. Kelling Nut Co., 1944-45
TRADE CAsES 1 57,405 (N.D. Ill. 1944) (motion) ; Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 3 F.R.D. 256 (D. N.J. 1943) (complaint upheld).
257. See, e.g., Report of conversation with Arnold Malkan, attorney for plaintiffs,
dated December 29, 1951, in Yale La, Library, on Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin
Corp., 9 F.R.D. 677 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (on motion); National Nut Co. of California v.
Kelling Nut Co., 194445 TRADE CASES f 57,405 (N.D. Ill. 1944) (motion). Cf. A. L, Smith
Iron Co. v. Dickson, 52 F.Supp. 566 (D. Conn. 1943) (tying of unpatented to patented
items through misrepresentation in advertising).
258. See. e.g., Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 101 F. Supp. 460
(N.D. Ill. 1951) (judgment for plaintiff); Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Products Co.,
89 F.Supp. 814 (D. N.J. 1950) (complaint of antitrust intervenor upheld).
259. This is the most frequent charge of patent "abuse." It generally arises in counter-
claims to patent infringement suit where the defendant attempts to show either (1) that
the patentee's patent is invalid or (2) that its scope does not extend to the counterclaim-
ant's product. In either event, since a successful defense to the infringement suit contains
these same elements, the private antitrust counterclaim requires little additional proof. See,
e.g., Master Metal Strip Service, Inc. v. Protex Weatherstrip Manufacturing Co., 169 F.
2d 700 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 898 (1948) (judgment for counterclaimant) ;
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150 F2d 69 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945) (judgment of infringement for patentee)-
Mercoid Corp. v. 'Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 142 F2d 549 (7th Cir. 1944)
(judgment for antitrust claimant); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 7
F.R.D. 564 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (motion). However, on some occasions, the private suit will
arise directly, see, e.g., Makegood Manufacturing Co. v. M.it Clip Co., 1948-49 TRADE
CAsEs 162,424 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1950) (cause transferred);
Forgett v. Charles Scharf, 181 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950)
(complaint reinstated) ; in other instances, the antitrust claim will be joined vith request
for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, or that defendant's patents are invalid and
plaintiff's are valid, see, e.g., Magnetic Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Dings Mag-
netic Separator Co., 86 F.Supp. 13 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) (motion); Reynolds International
Pen Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 382 (D. Del. 1946) (motion).
260. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) (territorial restriction
of markets; judgment for defendant reversed); Lyophile-Cryochem Corp. v. Cutter
Laboratories, Inc., 78 F.Supp. 903 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (same; cross-claim for antitrust vio-
lation denied); Newark Evening News Publishing Co. v. King Features Syndicate, Inc.,
7 F.R.D. 645 (D. N.J. 1948) (motion for summary judgment denied).
261. See note 259 supra.
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equally applicable to the antitrust cause of action, antitrust counterclaims
easily follow.
Private attacks based on illegal patent use have been highly successful,
with claimants victorious in half their reported suits. 20 2 While a few claim-
ants have struck at restraints involving basic industrial processes such as
oil cracking263 or hydraulic gas distribution systems, 2 4 successful suits
against patent misuse are frequently concerned with violations of lesser
national significance. Litigation by "launderette" operators, for example, has
resulted in breakup of tying agreements that had forced them to buy other
products when lasing patented washing machines;205 illegal tying clauses
on butter printing machinery have been eliminated;206 and attempts to ex-
pand patent control over unpatented weather stripping 20 7 or furnace thermo-
stats 268 have likewise been stymied. On the other hand, many actions directly
affect manufacture and sale of popular consumer goods such as ball point
pens, films, or woolens.20 And in the related field of unlawful copyright
use, private suitors have enjoined the attempts of authors and composers
to create a monopoly, based on transfer of all non-dramatic performing rights
to a single association.270 In sum, the effects of this patent litigation on
specific goods and practices are scattered through the economy.
Professional Sports
Until recently, suits involving practices in organized baseball were uni-
formly dismissed. Courts, adhering to the Supreme Court's ruling in the
262. Analysis of reported cases (official and unofficial) reveals a total of 30 suits of
which seven were judgments for plaintiffs, seven were judgments for defendants (includ-
ing dismissal of complaints), seven complaints were upheld, and nine appeared on motions
having no immediate bearing on disposition.
263. Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 79 F.Supp. 1013
(S.D. N.Y. 1947).
264. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
265. Report of conversation with Arnold Malkan, attorney for plaintiffs, dated Decem-
ber 29, 1951, in Yale Law Library. See Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 9 F.R.
D. 677 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (on motion).
266. Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 814 (D. N.J. 1950).
267. Master Metal Strip Service, Inc. v. Protex Weatherstrip Manufacturing Co., 169
F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 898 (1948).
268. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 142 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.
1944).
269. Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Co., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (ille-
gal use of trademark to fix prices) ; Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F.Supp.
325 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (conspiracy to keep film for plaintiff manufacturer's camera from
market) ; Reynolds International Pen Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 382 (D. Del. 1946)
(conspiracy to monopolize sale of ball-point pens by threatening retailers with infringe-
ment suits and refusals to sell).
270. Alden Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). See also
Ring v. Spina, 84 F.Supp. 403 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), modified, Ring v. Authors' League of
America, 186 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 935 (1951).
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1922 Federal Baseball Chb case,2 71 held that baseball was not "trade or
commerce" within the meaning of antitrust statutes,272 But in 1949, the
Second Circuit's Gardella v. Chandler decision 2 7 3 defied a history of base-
ball exemption. Gardella, a former major league ball player, sued baseball
officials for their concerted action in suspending him from organized base-
ball when he left his ball club to play elsewhere. In reversing the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit neatly side-stepped
previous "commerce" holdings to find that baseball's association with radio
and television subjected the industry to antitrust proscriptions27 4 Subse-
quently, defendants, apparently unwilling to gamble on testing the new "com-
merce" holding, settled the Gardella case and two similar claims filed shortly
afterward.27 5
But with "commerce" bars down, other parties pressed claims against the
industry. Radio stations, for example, challenged an industry rule prevent-
ing competing broadcasts.2 76 These suits and subsequent Justice Department
pressure induced modification of the rule.2 7 7 Currently, pending suits strike
directly at the cornerstones of baseball organization: (1) an action by a
minor league ball club for industry refusal to permit hiring of Mexican
players challenges the tight self-regulation exercised by organized baseball;
s78
and (2) claims similar to Gardella's challenge the reserve clause of baseball
employment contracts.2 7 9 However, nothing has yet crystallized baseball's
antitrust status. Latest developments are the refusals of two lower courts
to follow the Gardella "commerce" rulings.2 sO With these cases on appeal,2 1
271. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
272. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F.Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951) and cases
cited therein. And cf. Comment, 44 I.. L Rnv. 495 n.9 and cases cited therein.
273. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), reversing 79 F.Supp. 260 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
274. 172 F.2d at 407, 411, 414-5. For general discussion of antitrust problems in
organized baseball, see Topkis, Moitopoly in Professional Sports, 5S YALE L.J. 691 (1949);
Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. oF Cm L. REv. 56 (1949).
275. Gardella had claimed $300,000 in damages. Subsequent claims by Martin and
Lanier were for $1,000,000 and $1,500,000 respectively. See Martin v. National League
Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949) (denial of temporary injunction). While the
precise amounts of settlement are not knowm, they have been thought considerable. See
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House J udi-
ciary Commsittee, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1952).
276. See N.Y. Times, April 15, 1952, p. 32, col. 5 reporting cases of TriCity Broad-
casting Co. v. Cincinnati Reds, and Liberty Broadcasting Co. v. 13 major league clubs
(denial of temporary restraining order).
277. See Hearings, supra note 275.
278. See N.Y. Times, December 6, 1951, p. 45, col. 6, reporting case of Corbett and
El Paso Baseball Club v. Chandler.
279. See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1952, p. 35, col 7, reporting case of Prendergast v.
Syracuse. And see cases cited note 280 infra.
280. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F.Supp. 93 (S.D. CaL 1951). And see N.Y.
Times, December 6, 1951, p. 45, col. 6, reporting Kovalsld v. Chandler.
281. See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1952, p. 35, col. 7, reporting the staying of the Pre;:dcr-
gast suit until determination of the Toolson and Kowalshi reserve clause cases on appeal
in the 9th and 5th circuits respectively.
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and others currently pending against the industry, definitive court adjudi-
cations seem likely in the near future. 28 2
Regulated Industries
A substantial portion of private suits have struck at practices in regulated
.industries.28 3 As indicated by successful actions, regulation does not pro-
vide an industry with a per se exemption from antitrust proscriptions. 281
However, courts frequently dismiss private suits in deference to the primary
jurisdiction of regulating agencies where the agency is competent to deal
with the subject matter and award the requested relief. Since the "com-
petence" of an agency in any situation is governed by the statutes tinder
which it operates, the primary jurisdiction rule produces different results in
different fields.285 The Supreme Court, for example, has just explicitly ruled
out Sherman Act suits against shippers for fixing of rates by conference
282. Apparently, private suits in the baseball world have opened up other sports to
antitrust attack. See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1952, p. 39, col. 6, reporting Peller v. Inter-
national Boxing Club (conspiracy forcing fighters' managers to cancel bout promoted by
plaintiff). And see United States v. International Boxing Casino of New York, Inc., Civil
Action No. 74-81, CCH TRADE REG. RE'. CURRENT '66,022 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
283. Cases in public regulated areas comprise about 8% of the total reported (official
and unofficial) private suits from 1944 to 1951. See Appendix II, p. 1064 infra.
284. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) ; United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). And see cases cited notes 287-9 1n Ira. For
general discussion of the application of antitrust law in public regulated industries, see
Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1951).
285. Thus, for example, where regulatory bodies are "competent" to establish rates,
once such rates are approved by the commission, they cannot be subsequently called
"illegal" in court action under antitrust laws. See, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest
R.R. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (dismissal of action for overcharge on railroad rates);
American Cooperative Serum Association v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) (damages allowed for discriminatory pricing only
prior to price lists becoming operative on filing with the Secretary of Agriculture). Even
where approval of the attacked activity has not been given by the regulatory body, the
scope of the regulatory statute may in some cases preclude antitrust suits, see, e.g., Far
East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (charge of rate fixing in shipping
by conference agreement dismissed), while in other instances court action may be stayed
pending determination by the commission of what a lawful rate should have been, see,
e.g., Keith Railway Co. v. American Association of Railroads, 64 F.Supp. 917 (N.D. Ill.
1946) (conspiracy to reduce mileage allowances to owner-lessor of tank cars). However,
recent decisions indicate that even where rates are subsequently declared illegal by the
regulatory commission, antitrust court actions will still be dismissed either because (1)
rates on file are presumed lawful until changed or (2) the subsequent declaration of ille-
gality has no bearing on what rates should have been at the time the cause of action arose.
See, e.g., McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., CCH TRADE REaG. REP. CURaN
167,250 (D. Minn. 1952) (discriminatory rates by carriers of natural gas); Interstate
Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 102 F.Supp. 685 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (same),
For further variations on regulatory body "competence" see notes 287, 289 infra.
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agreement.2S8 On the other hand, damage claims against airlines' conspiracies
to drive competitors out of business have been recently entertained by courts,
with the accompanying request for injunction referred to an administrative
tribunal.2 87 And private suits have also been entertained, for example, against
railroad rate discrimination, 2 8 and territorial division of markets by compet-
ing power companies. 2s 9
Labor
Although the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts exempt "labor dis-
putes" from antitrust proscriptions, -01 unions have nevertheless been victims
of successful private antitrust attacks. In some instances, antitrust immunity
has been pierced when courts found that the "union" was a business asso-
ciation rather than a labor group. Thus, for example, organizations composed
of boat owners and fishermen selling their catch on a pro rata basis were
enjoined from a strike aimed at compelling purchasers to pay higher prices
286. Far East Conference v. United States, supra note 285. See also United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 2S4 U.S. 474 (1932).
287. SSW, Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(action for treble damages sustained since CAB is not competent to award damages for
antitrust violations, but damage suit stayed until request for injunction is heard by com-
mission since CAB can issue cease and desist order). In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American
Airlines, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 162,889 (D. N.J. 1951), the court upheld the com-
plaint for triple damages, but in contrast to the Air Transport case supra, proceeded to
hear the damage claim immediately, arguing that CAB had no authority to disapprove the
driving of a competitor out of business. See also Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific
Ltd., 78 F.Supp. 1 (D. Hawaii 1948) (charge of illegal combination of shipping company
and airlines immediately heard by court since neither CAB nor Maritime Commission
could award damages or hear both defendants).
288. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
289. Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co., 194 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1952). See also Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consoli-
dated Gas Electric Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. dcnicd, 340
U.S. 906 (1950). But see Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F2d 230 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 931 (1952) (authority of FPC to require interconnec-
tion of facilities supersedes operation of antitrust laws against pooling agreement with
territorial division of markets).
290. See 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1946) ; 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1946). Section 20 of the Clayton Act exempted enumerated activities called "labor
disputes" from the operation of the antitrust laws. However, in Duplex Printing Press v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the Supreme Court narrowly read the § 20 exemp-
tion to apply only to disputes between an employer and his own employees. Subsequently,
in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (government prosecution against car-
penters' union engaged in a jurisdictional strike), the Court interpreted Norris La-Guardia
as having expanded the definition of exempted "labor disputes" beyond the bounds of
employer-employee relations and consequently greatly increased § 20's antitrust immuni-
zation. For private antitrust litigation in the labor field prior to the Hutclheson case,
see Comments: 49 YALE L.J. 518, 530-1 (1940) ; id. at 293 n.92 (1939) ; 38 Ya. L.J.
506 n.23 (1929).
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for fish.291 Other cases follow the leading 1945 Allen Bradley decision 2.2
which enjoined a conspiracy of unions and employer groups directed at fix-
ing prices and excluding employers' competitors from the market.2 2 Appar-
ently encouraged by these new gaps in labor immunity, private plaintiffs have
sought to disguise traditional "labor disputes" in the antitrust language of
successful suits. But attempts to narrow further labor's exemption have thus
far failed. 294
Other Areas
Many private suits defy neat classification, since they strike at all sectors
of the economy and run the entire gamut of antitrust violations. Robinson-
Patman plaintiffs have secured judgments against their suppliers, involving,
for example, discriminatory discounts and freight equalization, 2 5 and cos-
metics manufacturers' discriminatory furnishing of demonstrator services or
allowances.296 Sherman Act claimants have prevailed in suits charging con-
291. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942) ; Hawaiian
Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 72 F.
Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947). The successful private suit in the Hinton case pioneered
the pathway for subsequent government actions based on the Hinton theory. See, e.g.,
United States v. Local 33 of the International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America,
Cr. No. 21379 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (fish industry) ; United States v. Local 36 of the Inter-
national Fishermen & Allied Workers of America, 177 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950) (fish industry); United States v. Milk Haulers & Dairy
Workers Union Local 916, 1950-51 TRADE CASES 62,887 (S.D. Ill. 1951) (milk industry).
292. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
293. Id. at 809. See, e.g.. Philadelphia Record Co. v. Photo Engravers, 155 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1946) (agreement between union and commercial photo engravers' association that
union would do no commercial work for plaintiff photo engraver without permission of
association); Anderson-Friberg v. Justin R. Clary & Son, Inc., 98 F.Supp. 75 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) (conspiracy between local stone cutters' union and dealers to exclude out-of-state
plaintiff's granite from local market). The Allen Bradley doctrine has also paved the way
for government action. See United States v. West Texas-New Mexico Chapter, National
Electrical Contractors' Ass'n, Cr. No. 45,500 (W.D. Tex. 1950) (jury verdict of not
guilty).
294. Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) (charge by losing
union in jurisdictional dispute that employer and other union had conspired to force plain.
tiffs out of work) ; Mitchell v. Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949) (attempt of plaintiff
cab company to defeat union organizational activities by leasing cabs to drivers and alleg-
ing drivers are "independent businessmen" within the Hinton rule) ; East Texas Motor
Freight Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947)
(employer charge that union's successful secondary boycott of employer's customers was
an illegal conspiracy within Allen Bradley rule); New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94
F.Supp. 113 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (employer charge that union suasion of employer's patrons
to boycott was illegal conspiracy within Allen Bradley rule).
295. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
296. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass, 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
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spiracies to fix liquor and sugar beet prices -7 and to monopolize a wholesale
tobacco outlet.290 Suits currently pending.reflect a similar diversity of charges
and parties. Competitors of sellers, invoking long-dormant section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, have charged predatory pricing of dairy products and
halvah.299 Retailers now claim price discrimination in sales, for example, of
pens and liquor3 00 News distributors and fireworks manufacturers are charged
with concerted refusals to sell.30' And manufacturers of shoe repair items
and processed yarn are under fire for alleged price fixing conspiracies in their
respective fields.302
EVALUATION
While inflated concepts of "violation" and "interstate commerce" permit
attack on an ever-growing range of business activity, the compensatory nature
of the private suit limits the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue. True, fictional
damage measures may permit suits, in a few instances, by parties who suffer
no injury at all. And current atrophy of defenses enables actions by even
those who themselves violate the antitrust laws. But restrictive cause and
injury interpretations may still preclude automatically all private attacks for
some violations.3 3
New trends, however, lessen plaintiffs' proof obstacles. Inferential proof
can now demonstrate cause and damages, and the adoption of fictional absolute
damage standards eliminates the necessity, in some cases, of tracing the
violation's complete effects on plaintiff's business. Damages from price dis-
crimination, for example, may be provable by reference to the discrimination
alone. And the results of prior successful government proceedings come in
via § 5 of the Clayton Act or the back door of judicial notice. Government
297. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (liquor);
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., CCH TADE Rro. REP. CumrmzT
67,246 (9th Cir. 1952) (sugar beets).
298. American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F2d 869 (4th Cir.
1950).
299. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F.Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950)
(milk); Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent Halvah & Candies, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 700
(S.D. N.Y. 1949) (halvah). Cf. Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., 1950-51 Tmuz CAs5s
162,859 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (section 3 price discrimination in sales of milk).
300. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952) (liquor); Fisher v.
Eversharp, 1950-51 TRADE CASES ff 62,8839 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) (pens).
301. Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, Inc., 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1946) (fireworks);
Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 10 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
302. Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., 99 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (shoe
repair); Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
303. See, e.g., notes 52, 63-6, 85 supra. Of course, restrictive interpretations may not
always preclude all actions, but may make proof so difficult that actions become unfeasible.
See, e.g., note 85 supra (purchasers forced to show that increased monopoly costs have not
been passed on); note 90 supra (Robinson-Patman plaintiffs unable to use "general"
damage yardsticks). Compare Note, 63 HARv. L. REV. 907, 909 (1950).
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litigation, moreover, provides private parties with leads and sources of
evidence. Nevertheless, private antitrust suits may still create special evi-
dentiary difficulties. Proof problems of course vary with each suit, but plain-
tiffs may be forced to produce a plethora of complex" market data to establish
the existence of the antitrust violation. Or issues may require presentation
of evidence of illegal practices scrupulously concealed behind facades of busi-
ness legitimacy.30 4
Cost burdens resulting from complex litigation, moreover, may impede
the institution of private suits. True, plaintiffs may economize costs through
joint action and judicious choice of forum. But evidence procurement, while
facilitated by broad discovery provisions and devices for utilization of prior
government proceedings, still results in substantial expense.805 And expert
testimony and antitrust legal talent come high.800 Moreover, suits may drag
on interminably as defendants, faced with triple liability and adverse public
relations, litigate to the hilt 307 or perhaps seek deliberate delay to exhaust
304. See generally, Testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra
note 202, at 59-60; Testimony of Milton Handler, id. at 2 et seq.; HAMiLTON & TILL,
ANTITRUST IN ACrTION 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940). The amount of proof utilized in
some government cases indicates that in certain areas private actions independent of prior
government suits would simply be impossible, see, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 687 (1948) (100,000 page record compiled in three years of FTC hearings on basing-
point system). And see ANNUAL.. REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 204, at 44 (antitrust patent
suit involving 6,000 patents), especially since even the Antitrust Division, with recourse
to FBI and grand jury investigations, see Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division, supra note 203, at 55-61, may be unable to
solve evidence procurement problems, see id. at 61. But even where prior government
decrees are available for use, the abnormal length of private litigation would indicate the
complexity of proof problems involved. See note 307 infra. For problems of courtroom
presentation of complex antitrust issues see generally, McAllister, The Big Case: Pro-
cedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REV. 27 (1950).
305. For costs of discovery see note 166 supra. While investigatory costs for plain-
tiffs are not available, the high cost of defending suit, see notes 235 supra, 329, 332 in Ira,
and government estimates of FBI investigation expenses averaging $100,000 per suit, see
Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 10, indicate that in some instances investigation
expenses may simply prohibit private suits.
306. "The more you get into this field, the more you recognize that this is not the
area of general practice.... [The antitrust bar] is probably the highest paid bar, the most
lucrative practice ...... Testimony of Graham H. Morison, Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 17. And
see Applebaum v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 62,944 (S.D. Miss.
1951) (compensation in form of reasonable attorney fee for plaintiff's counsel should be
higher than ordinary legal compensation). But cf. Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 1951). While high priced expert testimony is not a pre-
requisite to private suit, its absence, especially in proof or damages, may be fatal to plain.
tiff's case. See e.g., note 100 supra.
307. The median time from filing to disposition of private antitrust cases was (for
the years 1947-1949) 22 months as compared to a median of less than 10 months for all
tried civil cases. And government and private suit antitrust trials are over five times the
length of usual civil litigation. See ANNUAL REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 204, at 43-4.
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plaintiffs' finances.3 08 Private antitrust remedies may thus be simply unavail-
able to potential plaintiffs whose damages are relatively minor or whose
financial standing is weak.
Private claimants must also face the danger of trade reprisals, especially
acute where antitrust violators control a potential plaintiff's limited sources
of supply.309 Reprisals here may take the form, for example, of boycotts or
delivery delays.3 10 On the other hand reprisals can occur among competitors
as well. Strong competitors can threaten to "intensify" competition,311 or,
where patents are concerned, harry plaintiffs with costly infringement liti-
gation.312 Since the line between subtle reprisal and justified business practice
is difficult to draw, victims have little chance of subsequent legal redress.
308. Techniques of delay and harassment are apparently a well kmown part of anti-
trust counsel's equipment. See Testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Judiciary Committee, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 290-91 (1949). And see note 167 supra for defendant's use of deliberate
delay in discovery proceedings.
309. While no detailed data has been collected on the extent to which a fear of repri-
sal discourages suit, correspondents indicate that it has played a potent role. Aluminum
fabricators report that they are so "dependent upon the good vill of their supplier...
they can hardly afford to inspire antagonism." See, e.g., Communications to the YaL
LAw JoUmNAL from Eugene Dynner of Metal Trims, Inc., dated January 10, 1952, and
from Arnold Troy of Eastern Metal Products Co., dated February 1, 1952, in Yale Law
Library. Tire retailers express similar views, see, e.g., Communication to Y=am LAw
JouiRAL. from George J. Burger of the National Federation of Independent Business,
dated December 19, 1951, in Yale Law Library. Some commentators rate fear of reprisals
as the most significant deterrent of private antitrust suits. See, e.g., Testimony of Walton
Hamilton, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Study of 3onopoly Power of the
House Judiciary Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1949); Vold, Are Threefold
Damages Under the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 2S Ky. L. J. 117, 141 (1940).
However, their assertions are unsupported. For argument that triple damages are, in part,
compensation for the future reprisals to which suitors expose themselves, see Vold, supra
at 140 et seq.
310. See sources cited note 309 supra. For discussion of the various forms that sup-
pliers' economic reprisals may assume, see HAm 'ou & Tmi., ArmusT iNl AcrtoN 47
(TNEC Monograph 16, 1940) (cancellation of long term business agreements, credit re-
fusals, delivery delays, obstacles to return of goods).
311. Ibid. (price cutting, pressure put on suppliers or purchasers). And see Com-
munication to the YALE LAw Joux.NAL from Raymond P. Lipe of Defiance Sparkplug
Corp., dated December 19, 1951, in Yale Law Library (withdrawal of complaints by eight
small sparkplug manufacturers because of fear of reprisal by competitor). The aluminum
fabricators, for example, are in the precarious position of competing with their supplier
who is also engaged in fabricating. See Communication to the YALE LAw JoURMAL from
Arnold Troy of Eastern Metal Products Co., dated February 1, 1952, in Yale Law
Library.
312. See, e.g., United States v. Economic Concentration and Monopoly, Staff Report
to the Monopoly Subcommittee of the House Small Business Committee Pursuant to H.
Res. 64, 79th Cong., (1946) for the use of threats of infringement suits to demolish com-
petition in tungsten carbide production, pp. 217, 218, manufacture and sale of glassware,
pp. 225, 227, and in manufacture and sale of lamp making machinery, p. 232.
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Consequently, plaintiffs may remain inactive or seek enforcement through
protective anonymity of complaints voiced with the Justice Department or
Federal Trade Commission.313
When private suits are brought, however, they are potent weapons of
antitrust enforcement. One immediate outcome of successful private suits
is injunctive relief that, though strictly limited to the parties before the
court,3 14 halts violations causing existing or potential injuries to particular
plaintiffs. Although suits for injunctions raise much the same legal issues
as damage claims, they do not provide the attraction of triple recoveries and
attorney fee awards. Consequently, the injunction action lacks the popularity
of the damage suit, and requests for injunctions are frequently joined with
damage claims rather than pursued alone. But while only ten injunctions
were granted in private suits (excluding antitrust counterclaims and patent
litigation) from 1947 to 1951,3'r their impact has nevertheless been felt.
Where injured plaintiffs, for example, have been unable to prove the amount
of their damages, injunctions have issued to halt violations a1 And where
injury is threatened rather than actual, injunction suits have provided relief
-a result that no damage claim could effectuate.asl Moreover, injunctions,
once given, have apparently been sufficient to halt injury, for reported cases
reveal only a single attempt to invoke contempt sanctions for violations
enjoined since 1944.318
In damage suits, plaintiffs' victories punish antitrust violators with huge
assessments of triple damages and attorney fees. Actions terminated between
1947 and 1951 produced fifteen damage awards for plaintiffs110 While
313. Former Attorney General Clark estimated that 90% of the cases filed by the
Antitrust Division originate in private complaints. See TimBERG, THE ANTITRUST LAWS
FROM THE POINT OF VImV OF A GOVERNMENT ATrORNEY 36-7 (1949). For procedure In-
volved and infomation desired in filing private compaints, see id. at 37. Complaints to the
Antitrust Division will probably receive even closer attention in the future, for special
procedures to expedite handling of complaints have recently been instituted in local anti-
trust offices. See 20 U.S.L. WEZx 2333 (February 5, 1952).
314. See cases cited note 77 supra. One commentator suggests increasing the en-
forcement effect of private injunction suits by framing decrees to protect the entire public
in the light of what the individual trial revealed. See Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Judiciary Committee, 81st Cong., 1st S05s.
295-6 (1949).
315. See Appendix I, p. 1063 infra. Figures prior to 1947 are not available.
316. E.g., Ring v. Spina, 84 F.Supp. 403 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) ; Alden Rochelle, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Finley v. Music Corp. of America, 66 F.
Supp. 569 (S.D. Cal. 1946). And similarly, an injunction may be awarded where damage
awards were precluded by primary jurisdiction of a regulating agency. Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
317. E.g., Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951).
318. See Bigelow v. RKO-Radio Pictures, Inc., 78 F.Supp 250 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd,
170 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1948) (film distributors held in contempt for creating "dead time"
between end of first run in their theatres and subsequent runs in other theatres).
319. See Appendix I, p. 1063 infra.
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amounts, of course, varied with each suit. many reached staggering propor-
tions: seven damage awards were in excess of $100,000, 20 with at least two
hedging the $1,000,000 mark.32  Totals for awards prior to 1947 and sub-
sequent to 1951 are not available. But reported cases indicate that earlier
judgments produced equally impressive sums,3 and recent 1952 verdicts
climb to even higher levels.3 m Moreover, attorney fee awards add consider-
ably to defendants' financial attrition. In no reported instance since 1946
have fees fallen below $19,000; and a recent fee award hit an all-time high of
$132,000.324
The large number of settlements in private suits, however, makes plain-
tiffs' judgments an unrevealing index of the impact of the private antitrust
action. Prospects of long and costly antitrust litigation are probably a power-
ful inducement for both parties to settle. And the threat of triple liability and
unfavorable publicity militates even more strongly for defendants' compro-
mise. Correspondence from nineteen law firms litigating private antitrust suits
indicates that, exclusive of movie litigation, 25 per cent of all actions filed
are eventually settled out of court.32  Thus, it may be conservatively estimated
that in the past five years private plaintiffs have secured some satisfaction in
106 actions, besides the 28 in which they obtained damages or injunctions32
320. Ibid.
321. Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)($975,000 damages;
$50,000 attorney fees); Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F2d 561 (7th Cir.
1951) ($941,514.30 damages; $75,000 attorney fees). For other rcporlcd damage amounts
from 1947-1951, see American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1951) ($180,000 damages; $35,000 attorney fees). Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe
American Corp., 101 F.Supp. 460 (N.D. Ill. 1951) ($118,000 damages). And see movie
cases cited note 225 supra.
322. See movie cases cited note 225 supra. And see smaller amounts av-arded in
American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1946)
($13,350 damages; $2,500 attorney fee); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,
150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945) ($3,030 damages).
323. Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 194 F.2d 846
(8th Cir. 1952) ($1,125,000 damages; $100,000 attorney fee) ; Sager Glove Corp. v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 1950-51 TRADE CASES 162,956 (N.D. Ill. 1951) ($975,00D damages;
$132,000 attorney fee).
324. Ibid.
325. See Appendi:x III, p. 1065 infra. Of course, settlement experience varies widely
with different firms and clients. As contrasted, for example, to defendants' apparent readi-
ness to settle in movie litigation, see note 226 supra, others have evidenced a strong antip-
athy towards compromise in treble damage suits, see, e.g., Communication to Y=u LAX,
JouN.A from Henry F. Herbermann, counsel for General Motors Corp., dated December
28, 1951, in Yale Law Libraryi especially when suits have already begun, see, c.g., Com-
munication to YAix LAw JounRAL from Gerhard A. Gesell, dated December 31, 1951, in
Yale Law Library. For settlement prior to institution of suit see note 327 infra.
326. The figure is obtained by calculating 25% of the 423 cases terminated in United
States District Courts between 1947 and 1951. See Appendix I, p. 1053 infra. Actually,
however, the computations are extremely conservative for extrapolation to all suits since
settlements in movie litigation probably occur with much greater frequency than in other
areas. See note 226 supra.
10591952]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
And this, of course, does not include the apparently numerous occasions on
which parties threatening private antitrust action secured desired modification
of conduct or financial redress.327 But while many settlements doubtless occur,
their precise extent and scope are unknown. Defense counsel do indicate,
however, that settlement payments are generally far less than damages
claimed. 328
Costs of defense impose additional financial punishment on defendants in
private suits. Legal and investigatory expenses in defending private antitrust
suits vary with the type of suit, location of trial, and the speed of disposition.
But in any event, costs seem startlingly high. In cases where more than
$150,000 is claimed as damages, probably representing over one half the
total private suits, defense counsel indicate that average costs per firm range
from $17,000 to $250,000, 829 while movie companies report that "paper
work" alone averages $25,000 for each defense. 830 And even where settle-
ments are effected, defendants' expenses may run into five figures.881 More-
over, the huge cost of maintaining suit undoubtedly gives rise to still another
expenditure for defendants facing several actions: the "buying off" of nui-
sance claimants who harry defendants in the wake of successful government
antitrust proceedings8 3'
In fact, private antitrust enforcement largely rests on prior government
action. All of the movie litigation and approximately two-thirds of other
private suits have followed successful government antitrust proceedings. 3 3
327. "We can say with assurance ... that the great bulk of bona fide treble damage
claims are settled-and in our experience reasonably to the satisfaction of the claimants
-before suit is brought. The great uncertainties involved in applying the law to treble
damage facts makes settlement rather than litigation almost mandatory in most situations,
In other words, the courts' records on treble damage actions are of little significance."
Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Jerrold G. Van Cise, dated January 2,
1952, in Yale Law Library. (Emphasis added.) But see Appendix III, p. 1065 itfra.
328. See Appendix III, p. 1065 infra.
329. Ibid.
330. See note 235 .upra.
331. See Appendix III, p. 1065 infra.
332. While apparently frequent settlements for less than one per cent of damages claimed
would seem to indicate successful nuisance claims in many instances, see Appendix I1,
p. 1065 infra, the following remarks to the contrary are also typical of many general replies
from counsel: "Our practice has been in almost all situations strongly to urge our clients
to litigate, not to settle ... [for] nuisance value. I think you will find very few plaintiffs
who will take a settlement by the payment of a nuisance amount [since] litigation of treble
damage cases is very expensive." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Ger-
hard A. Gesell, dated December 31, 1951, in Yale Law Library. However, when nuisance
claims do occur and defendants choose to resist them, legal and investigatory expenses
may still be considerable. Since suits may be filed and discovery procedures commenced
with ease, see p. 1033 supra, the nuisance claim may not be spotted until litigation is well
under way, see, e.g., Shotkin v. General Electric Co., 169 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1948) (case
dismissed after one year of dragging through plaintiff's "groundless" motions and dilatory
tactics), and even when spotted may be impossible to halt without defense expenditures.
333. See Appendix III, p. 1065 infra.
[Vol. 61 : 10101060
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
But while private suits usually follow government activity, they do more
than duplicate government work. Thus, for example, private suits after govern-
ment actions frequently adjudicate practices not covered by government
decrees, or, in some instances, serve partially to fill the breach left open by
inadequate government policing of decrees. And of course, to the e-x-tent
that private suits do occur, they augment the financial impact and conse-
quently the deterrent value of both civil and criminal government actions.
Independently of government suits, private enforcement has achieved some
success in limited areas. Its most striking solo accomplishment has probably
been in patent cases, where private suits have continued the government
trend toward restricting the scope of the patentee's monopoly. In addition,
in both professional athletics and labor-management conspiracies, for example,
private action has laid the groundwork for attainment of antitrust objectives
where previous government attacks failed. And conversely, independent suits
have pursued a host of violations in minor sectors of the economy not target
of strategic government attack.
Significantly, however, the effects of private enforcement extend far be-
yond immediate parties in government and private suits. Since even a wholly
successful defense of a single action entails considerable costs, the threat of
private antitrust attack is a potent deterrent to potential violators. And when
the impact of private suits becomes cumulative, as in the movie industry, the
lesson for all businessmen is striking. In fact, private enforcement has intro-
duced a prophylactic note of caution into business practice, as evidenced by
the current liaison between antitrust lawyers and business. Letters from
counsel, for example, report the frequent consideration and rejection of pro-
posed business practices bordering on illegality by clients who wish to avoid
treble damage liability.334
But while the private action does enforce antitrust laws, it may produce
undesirable results as well. Because of the threat of subsequent triple damage
attacks following litigated government actions, defendants in government suits
can try the validity of their practices only at the risk of incurring severe
financial punishment. At the same time, since there is no limit on te number
of private suits, cumulative actions may strike hard at a defendant's single
misstep. In the light of uncertainties of antitrust proscriptions, both results
334. The following is typical of several replies: "Clients frequently ask counsel to
advise as to the legality under the antitrust laws of some proposed act or practice which
is not clearly violative of the antitrust laws, but which cannot unqualifiedly be said to be
lawful. Indictment under the criminal sections of the antitrust laws is unlikely in these
borderline cases. Under such circumstances, we find that the threat of treble damage suits,
even more than the possibility of Government action, deters businessmen from carrying
out the proposed acts or practices. It is our estimate that for every act or practice which
results in an actual treble damage claim there are hundreds of others which were once
considered for action by businessmen and were rejected by them because of the fear of
treble damage claims." Communication to the YAr. LAw Joutnx,. from Jerrold G. Van
Cise, dated January 2, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
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seem unduly harsh. In addition, private suits may create windfalls, for triple
damage awards and fictional damage measures shape recoveries in excess of
actual loss. And prospects of such recoveries have produced, according to
some defense counsel, a class of racketeer lawyers who thrive on pressing
groundless claims in hopes of quick settlement with defendants unwilling to
face substantial litigation costs.83,
Despite its defects, however, the private suit fulfills a needed function in
antitrust enforcement. Clearly, antitrust laws are not entirely self-enforcing
through private initiative. Dependence on prior government suits and the
sporadic and unpredictable impact of private attack makes the action ill-
adapted to effect a planned approach to antitrust problems. Nevertheless, the
effects of private suits in halting existing violations, in aiding government
enforcement, and in creating a powerful deterrent to future violations, define
its newly won significance in antitrust enforcement. 880 True, a sufficient
government antitrust program might conceivably achieve effective enforce-
ment without the defects of private action. But government activity is already
hamstrung by insufficient funds.337 And with private suits absent, present
Antitrust Division appropriations would have to be more than quadrupled to
plug the gap.338 Moreover, to the extent that private suits operate independently
of government enforcement, they provide a continuing police action against
violations irrespective of any momentary government apathy. And, of course,
the antitrust damage suit always offers an otherwise unavailable redress to
parties victimized by violations.
335. See, e.g., Letter from Louis Nizer, Hearings on S.1910, supra note 216, at 42, 44.
336. "[W]e have, for the first time since the history of the enactment of the [anti-
trust laws], begun to see the development of private litigation under the triple damage
statute, which is of substantial help. It already is a deterrent." Testimony of Graham 1.
Morison, Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 15.
337. While appropriations to the Antitrust Division have risen considerably over those
in past years, see Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Antitrust Division, supra note 203, at 50-1, lack of funds is still cited as one of the "out-
standing basic weaknesses" in the antitrust program. Id. at 75-6.
338. See Testimony of Graham H. Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, Hearings on H.R. 3408, supra note 202, at 15.
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